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The maritime information system (IS) user has to be prepared to deal with a potential 
safety and environmental risk that can be caused by an unanticipated failure to a cyber 
system used onboard a vessel. A hacker leveraging a maritime IS user’s Cyber Curiosity 
can lead to a successful cyber-attack by enticing a user to click on a malicious Web link 
sent through an email and/or posted on a social media website. At worst, a successful 
cyber-attack can impact the integrity of a ship’s cyber systems potentially causing 
disruption or human harm. A lack of awareness of social engineering attacks can increase 
the susceptibility of a successful cyber-attack against any organization. A combination of 
limited cyber situational awareness (SA) of social engineering attacks used against IS 
users and the user’s natural curiosity create significant threats to organizations. 
 
The theoretical framework for this research study consists of four interrelated constructs 
and theories: social engineering, Cyber Curiosity, Cyber Situational Awareness, and 
activity theory. This study focused its investigation on two constructs, Cyber Situational 
Awareness and Cyber Curiosity. These constructs reflect user behavior and decision-
making associated with being a victim of a social engineering cyber-attack. This study 
designed an interactive Web-based experiment to measure an IS user’s Cyber Situational 
Awareness and Cyber Curiosity to further understand the relationship between these two 
constructs in the context of cyber risk to organizations. The quantitative and qualitative 
data analysis from the experiment consisting of 174 IS users (120 maritime & 54 
shoreside) were used to empirically assess if there are any significant differences in the 
maritime IS user’s level of Cyber SA, Cyber Curiosity, and position in the developed 
Cyber Risk taxonomy when controlled for demographic indicators.  
 
To ensure validity and reliability of the proposed measures and the experimental 
procedures, a panel of nine subject matter experts (SMEs) reviewed the proposed 
  iv 
measures/scores of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The SMEs’ responses were 
incorporated into the proposed measures and scores including the Web-based experiment. 
Furthermore, a pilot test was conducted of the Web-based experiment to assess measures 
of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. This research validated that the developed Cyber Risk 
taxonomy could be used to assess the susceptibility of an IS user being a victim of a 
social engineering attack. Identifying a possible link in how both Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity can help predict the susceptibility of a social engineering attack can be 
beneficial to the IS research community. In addition, potentially reducing the likelihood 
of an IS user being a victim of a cyber-attack by identifying factors that improve Cyber 
SA can reduce risks to organizations. The discussions and implications for future 
research opportunities are provided to aid the maritime cybersecurity research and 
practice communities. 
  
  v 
Acknowledgements 
 
Thank you God, Jesus Christ, for giving me the strength and perseverance to complete 
this academic journey in the midst of a personally challenging period. To my wife 
Greydys, who has been an endless supply of love, support, encouragement, and course 
correction when required throughout the doctoral program. Even though you knew that 
embarking on this journey would take time away from you and our children, you 
nevertheless gave me the freedom to finish without making me feel guilty for the time of 
solitude on the evenings and weekends when I needed to work on the paper. To my 
daughters Genevieve, Tatiana, and Sofia for always giving me love and continued 
affirmations that you were proud of me for pursuing a PhD. Thanks to my family and 
close friends who have always been a source of rechargeable batteries of encouragement. 
 
I am indebted to my advisor, Dr. Yair Levy, for his wise counsel in helping me navigate 
the labyrinth of doctoral research. Without Dr. Levy’s candid feedback and patience in 
reviewing the many versions of the doctoral papers, from idea, proposal, to report, my 
paper would not have morphed into the final product. I also want to thank my committee 
members, Dr. Anat Hovav and Dr. Melissa Carlton, for their time and insightful feedback 
which improved the overall research.  
 
Many thanks to the professors in the doctoral program at Nova Southeastern University 
such as Dr. Ling Wang, Dr. Steve Terrel, Dr. Laurie P. Dringus for helping me develop 
my research skills throughout the core courses. I also want to thank the Ph.D. students 
that I met during the cluster weekends, I will always have fond memories of our 
interactions that helped fuel my desire to continue in the program. 
 
Much gratitude to Royal Caribbean for their sponsorship of my educational pursuit. A 
special thanks to the many IT executives, HR, Shipboard, and Maritime Cybersecurity 
team members who provided various means of encouragement and support for embarking 
and completing the doctoral program. 
 
Lastly, I dedicate this endeavor to my late father Ruben Perez who without his and my 
mother’s personal sacrifices to immigrate and provide a better life in the United States, it 
would have never given me the abundance of opportunities provided throughout my life. 
I hope that from above you are proud of what I have achieved as a son.  
  
  vi 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract iii 
List of Tables  ix 
List of Figures  xi 
 
Chapters 
 
1. Introduction 1 
Background 1 
Problem Statement 3 
Dissertation Goal 5 
Research Questions 9 
Relevance and Significance 10 
Relevance 10 
Significance 11 
Barriers and Issues 12 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 13 
Assumptions 13 
Limitations 14 
Delimitations 14 
Definitions of Terms 15 
Summary 16 
2. Review of the Literature 18 
Introduction 18 
Social Engineering 18 
Phishing 19 
Business Email Compromise 20 
Impersonation 21 
Situational Awareness 23 
SA in aviation 24 
SA in automobile safety 24 
SA in maritime industry 24 
Goal oriented situational awareness 25 
SA Perception, Comprehension, and Projection Elements in Different Domains 26 
Cyber Situational Awareness 30 
Curiosity and Cyber Curiosity 33 
Activity Theory 36 
History of Theory 36 
Evolution of Theory 38 
Activity Theory Use in the Maritime Industry 39 
Activity Theory Use in Safety and Other Industries 39 
  vii 
Demographic Indicators 42 
Age 42 
Years performing job 43 
Gender 44 
Nationality 44 
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in the Literature 48 
Methodology 50 
Overview of Research Design 50 
Phase One 52 
Phase Two 54 
Phase Three 55 
Experiment Development 56 
Expert Panel & Delphi Technique 58 
Pilot Testing 59 
Measuring Cyber Situational Awareness 60 
Measuring Cyber Curiosity 62 
Reliability and Validity 63 
Instrument Reliability 65 
Population and Sample 66 
Data Collection and Analysis 66 
Data Aggregation 66 
Research Question 4 (RQ4) 68 
Research Question 5 (RQ5) 68 
Resources 70 
Summary 71 
Results 72 
Overview 72 
Qualitative Research and Expert Panel (Phase One) 72 
Phase One – Data Collection 73 
Phase One – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 74 
Phase One – Expert Panel Characteristics 74 
Phase One – Data Analysis 75 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research and Expert Panel (Phase Two) 79 
Phase Two – Data Collection 80 
Phase Two – Data Pre-Analysis and Screening 80 
Phase Two – Expert Panel Characteristics 81 
Phase Two – Data Analysis 82 
Quantitative Research (Phase Three) 83 
Phase Three – Data Collection 84 
Phase Three – Data Pre-Analysis and Screening 85 
Phase Three - Data Analysis 87 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Positioning on Cyber Risk Taxonomy 93 
Cyber SA Data Analysis 98 
Cyber SA Data Analysis by Group 99 
Cyber Curiosity Data Analysis 101 
  viii 
Cyber Curiosity Data Analysis by Group 103 
Cyber Risk Data Analysis 105 
Summary 108 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 110 
Conclusions 110 
Discussion 111 
Implications 112 
Recommendations and Future Research 112 
Summary 113 
 
Appendices 
A. Site Approval Letter 117 
B. Institutional Review Board Approval Letter 118 
C. Expert Panel Recruitment Email 119 
D. Expert Panel Questionnaire: Instrument for Subject Matter Expert (SME) validation 
of components for the measures of Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) and Cyber 
Curiosity Levels 121 
E. Expert Panel Recruitment Email 133 
F. Expert Panel Questionnaire: Instrument for Subject Matter Expert (SME) Validation 
of Proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy 135 
G. Pilot Research Study Recruitment Email 141 
H. Pilot Research Study Recruitment Email (Cont.) 142 
I. Pilot Study Informed Consent Form 143 
J. Research Study Recruitment Email 147 
K. Research Study Informed Consent Form 148 
L. Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Shipboard) 151 
M. Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Shoreside) 155 
N. Blueprint of the Proposed Initial Measures 159 
References 161 
 
  
  ix 
 
List of Tables 
Tables 
1. Summary of Social Engineering Literature    22 
2. Examples of Perception, Comprehension, and Projected Elements for Different Job 
Domains 27 
3. Summary of Situational Awareness Literature   27 
4. Summary of Cyber Situational Awareness Literature   31 
5. Summary of Curiosity and Cyber Curiosity Literature   35 
6. Summary of Activity Theory Literature    40 
7. Summary of Demographic Indicators Literature   45 
8. Cyber SA Measurement Points (CSA-m)    61 
9. Cyber SA Time Measurement Points (CSA-tm)  60 
10. Cyber Curiosity Measurement Points    63 
11. Descriptive Distribution of the SMEs (n=9) 75 
12. SMEs Validation and Review of Cyber SA Components User Action 76 
13. SMEs Validation and Review of Cyber SA User Action Scores 77 
14. SMEs Validation and Review of Cyber SA Time Measurement Scores 78 
15. Cyber Curiosity Measurement Points 79 
16. Descriptive Statistics of the SMEs Round (n=5)  81 
17. SMEs validation of Proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy (n=5) 82 
18. Descriptive Statistics of the Participants (N=174) 88 
19. Descriptive Statistics of the Participants by Group 90 
  x 
20. Group Statistics for Demographics 92 
21. Independent Samples Test of Demographics 93 
22. ANOVA Results for Cyber SA (N=174)  98 
23. ANOVA Results for Each Group for Cyber SA  100 
24. Group Statistics for Cyber SA 101 
25. Independent Samples Test of Cyber SA 101 
 
26. ANOVA Results for Cyber Curiosity(N=174) 102 
27. ANOVA Results of Participants by Group for Cyber Curiosity 104 
28. Group Statistics for Cyber Curiosity 105 
29. Independent Samples Test of Cyber Curiosity 105 
30. ANOVA Results for Cyber Risk Score (N=174)   106 
31. ANOVA Results of Participants by Group for Cyber Risk 107 
32. Group Statistics for Cyber Risk  108 
33. Independent Samples Test of Cyber Risk  108  
  xi 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figures 
 
1. Cyber Risk taxonomy for susceptibility of being a victim of a social engineering cyber-
attack  7 
 
2. Model of SA in dynamic decision making adopted from Endsley (1995)  26 
 
3. Activity theory triadic schema adopted from Engeström (2006)   38 
 
4. The IS user activity system model adopted from Kaptelinin & Nardi (2006) 42 
 
5. Research Design Process  52 
 
6. Phase One - Research design to review and validate proposed measure components and 
proposed scores of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 54 
 
7. Phase 2 Research design to review and validate proposed classification for the Cyber 
Risk Taxonomy 55 
 
8. Research Study Experiment Steps 57 
 
9. Conceptual design of the Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measurement approach
 58 
 
10. Frequency Distribution of Cyber SA measures (total) for both maritime IS and 
shoreside users (N=174) 86 
 
11. Frequency Distribution of Cyber Curiosity measures for both maritime IS and 
shoreside users (N=174) 87 
 
12. IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy  95 
 
13. IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, Bubble size represents the 
participant count (N=174) 94 
 
14. Maritime IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, Bubble size 
represents the participant count (n=120) 
 
  xii 
15. Shoreside IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, Bubble size 
represents the participant count (n=54) 
 
16. Means of the Cyber SA scores by Department (N=174)  96 
 
17. Means of the Cyber Curiosity scores by Department (N=174) 98 
  
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
The maritime industry, a global, complex ecosystem that requires people to safely 
transport cargo and people, is highly dependent on operational technology (OT) such as 
navigation systems, propulsion, and power generation that is managed by information 
systems (IS) (Tucci, 2016). According to Kramek (2013), U.S. economic prosperity is 
dependent on maritime security. Maritime IS users are not exempt from the possibility of 
a cyber-attack because modern ships are equipped with broadband, high speed satellite to 
access the Internet and communicate with other networks. What is not well understood 
are specific cyber vulnerabilities of today’s modern maritime industry that may be 
susceptible to cyber-attacks. In the commercial maritime industry, there is a prevalent 
belief that cyber threats are theoretical in nature and usually linked to a doubt to whether 
there are individuals with a genuine motivation to perform a cyber-attack against their 
own company (Cyberkeel, 2014). Modern ship captains and their crew are responsible for 
safely navigating a ship using IS that are used to control electronic chart displays, radar 
systems, safety monitors, and propulsion systems. Navigation bridge officers rely on 
situational awareness depending on cyber technology to make rapid decisions to safely 
steer a ship and avoid a collision (Sandhåland, Oltedal, & Eid, 2015). The majority of 
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maritime accidents “are not caused by technical problems but by the failure of the crew to 
respond appropriately to the situation” (Barnett, Gatfield, & Pekcan, 2017, p. 2). In 
cybersecurity, the user is also identified as the weakest link, because even the strongest 
technical security controls can be bypassed easily through a social engineering attack 
(Chen, 2006; Mitnick, 2002; Schneier, 2000). In maritime safety, people are also the 
weakest link, not because of the people themselves, but because of the increased 
dependency on the use of IS in the way they perform their daily duties (Rothblum et al., 
2002). The use of IS to safely navigate and operate ships is becoming more complex in 
an industry that is typically diverse in cultures, values, and backgrounds (Progoulaki & 
Theotakas, 2016). The combination of the dependency of IS to safely navigate a ship and 
the susceptibility of IS users provides a window of opportunity for a successful social 
engineering cyber-attack. A social engineering attack is a technique used by hackers, 
leveraging human interactions or social skills, to gain useful information to infiltrate an 
organizational network (US-CERT, 2016). These human manipulations, used by hackers, 
have evolved from attempting to get a business user to divulge their credentials, to 
leveraging social media sites to perform reconnaissance to gain useful information about 
an organization (Algarni, Xu, Chan, & Tian, 2013; Mills, 2009). Given the likelihood of 
IS users being the victim of a social engineering cyber-attack, this study will develop and 
empirically validate an IS cyber situational awareness (SA) taxonomy in the context of 
Cyber Curiosity that can be used as a benchmark to measure the susceptibility of 
mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering techniques among critical maritime 
crew. 
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The main sections of this paper are: Problem Statement, Dissertation Goal, 
Research Questions, Relevance and Significance, Resources, and References. These 
sections build the research worthiness of the problem, elucidating the goals of the 
research, specifying the research questions that will be studied, the supporting literature, 
challenges that may be encountered in conducting the research, how the research and 
analysis will be conducted, a high level schedule to complete the research, any resources 
required, and a complete listing of the references used throughout the paper.  
 
Problem Statement 
The research problem that this study will address is the limited Cyber SA of social 
engineering threat vector used against information systems (IS) users, and the natural 
human curiosity that creates a significant cybersecurity threat to organizations (Iuga, 
Nurse, & Erola, 2016). The term Cyber SA in this context is defined by Tadda and 
Salerno (2010), where Cyber SA is the perception of cyber risk elements with respect to 
time and space, the understanding of their meaning, and anticipation of their status in the 
near future. Many IS users lack awareness of cybersecurity risks because their primary 
intention is to check email, browse Web pages, or use software (Whitten & Tygar, 1999). 
Despite recent efforts to improve Cyber SA, such as enabling cues on Web browsers 
warning users of a suspicious Website, IS users continue to fall prey to phishing attacks 
(Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Herzberg, 2009). Human curiosity can increase or 
reduce the success of a cyber-attack. Social engineering techniques leverage emotions, 
such as curiosity, to capture the attention of users to lure them to open malicious email 
attachments or web links (Abraham & Smith, 2010). Baiting, a form of a social 
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engineering attack, leverages human curiosity to lure a user to pick up a malware infected 
flash drive left abandoned on the floor (Fan, Lwakatare, & Rong, 2016).  
An industry that is highly susceptible to social engineering attacks is the maritime 
industry, because awareness of cybersecurity risks in the maritime sector is currently low 
to non-existent (European Network and Information Security Agency, 2011). This 
observation is pervasive across all maritime organizational layers including government 
bodies, port authorities, and maritime companies (Kramek, 2013). An explanation for the 
current level of Cyber SA in the maritime sector is the lack of publicly known 
cybersecurity incidents occurring within the maritime sector (ENISA, 2011). Moreover, a 
further explanation by Cyberkeel (2014) for the current level of Cyber SA is 
“unawareness of the actual incidents that have taken place in the maritime sector” (p. 3). 
As evidence that maritime cybersecurity incidents have occurred in the past, in 2014, 
several maritime companies, specifically shipping lines and bunker fuel suppliers, were 
infiltrated with a remote access tool (RAT). The RAT was used to monitor and spoof 
email resulting in fraud by changing their bank account information to re-route large 
payments (Cyberkeel, 2014). The relevance of maritime cyber risk is confirmed by 
Fitton, Prince, Gersmond, and Lacy (2015) in noting that:  
In the maritime environment people interact with computer systems extensively. 
Whether that is a ship’s navigation system, a drilling rig, a ballistic missile system 
or something as mundane as employee records. At every intersection of 
man/woman and machine there is the possibility for error, manipulation, coercion 
or sedition. (p. 15)  
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Human curiosity can increase or reduce the success of a cyber-attack. Social 
engineering techniques leverage emotions, such as curiosity, to capture the attention of 
users to lure them to open malicious email attachments or Web links (Abraham & Smith, 
2010). For example, baiting, a form of a social engineering attack, leverages human 
curiosity to lure a user to pick up a malware infected flash drive left abandoned on the 
floor (Fan, Lwakatare, & Rong, 2016). Reducing the likelihood of a successful social 
engineering cyber-attack can be accomplished through increasing situational awareness 
by becoming more knowledgeable of the indicators of a cyber-attack (Dutt, Ahn, & 
Gonzalez, 2012). The inquisitiveness for interacting with the domain of IS, information 
technology, and the Internet can be defined as Cyber Curiosity. Combining the lack of 
awareness in the maritime industry of targeted cyber-attacks (Cyberkeel, 2012; ENISA, 
2011) along with IS user’s Cyber Curiosity, influences the susceptibility of being victims 
of a social engineering attack (Iuga et al., 2016). However, there is a lack of established 
validated instruments to measure Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity in an effort to mitigate 
social engineering cyber-attack, especially in the maritime industry. Therefore, additional 
research is warranted to investigate the ways to measure IS user’s Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity, while using it to help identify the possibility of a successful social engineering 
cyber-attack.  
 
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this proposed research study is to design, develop, and to 
empirically validate an IS Cyber SA, in the context of Cyber Curiosity, taxonomy that 
measures the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering 
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techniques on IS users in the maritime industry. The proposed taxonomy will be reviewed 
and validated by subject matter experts (SMEs). The SMEs review of the developed 
taxonomy will improve content validity, construct validity, and reliability (Straub, 1989). 
This proposed study will use maritime IS users as the context. This proposed study 
suggests that two dimensions of the susceptibility of a successful social engineering 
cyber-attack are user Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The need for this proposed research 
is supported by Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard and Tennakoon (2016) who advocated that 
“awareness of risk has been shown to be an antecedent of the intention to perform 
security behaviors, both in personal and professional contexts” (p. 326). Recent research 
investigated the human factor of sensitivity of using Web browser warnings to IS users of 
a possible phishing attack as a training method to raise Cyber SA that an attack was likely 
(Iuga et al., 2016). Another earlier study by Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor (2006) looked 
into phishing attack susceptibility based on user’s decision strategies and their use of 
available cues to determine the “mental modes” used by people when reading emails. 
This proposed research builds on the aforementioned research by proposing a taxonomy 
to aid in the understanding of social engineering attacks based on a user’s level of Cyber 
SA and Cyber Curiosity.  
There are five specific goals of this proposed research study. The first goal of this 
proposed study is to identify, classify, and validate, using SMEs, the components for the 
measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The second goal is to identify the scores of 
the identified components of the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity, using SMEs 
that enable a validated aggregation to the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy. The third goal 
is to develop and validate, using SMEs, a Cyber Risk taxonomy to classify maritime IS 
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users by their level of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The fourth goal of this proposed 
study is to use the validated Cyber Risk taxonomy in an experiment to classify the 
maritime IS users. The last and fifth goal of this research study is to empirically assess if 
there are any significant differences in the maritime IS user’s level of Cyber SA, Cyber 
Curiosity, and position in the Cyber Risk taxonomy when controlled for demographics 
indicators such as: age, gender, nationality, department, years performing job function, 
and education level. 
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed taxonomy of a 2x2 matrix that will classify 
maritime IS users’ cyber risk by their level of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity (D-Type 
and I-Type).  
 
Figure 1. Cyber Risk taxonomy for susceptibility of being a victim of a social 
engineering cyber-attack 
 
The x-axis represents the level of IS user Cyber Curiosity (I-Type and D-Type) 
and the y-axis represents the level of IS users Cyber SA. The coordinates (x,y) represents 
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the combined value of both Cyber Curiosity and Cyber SA. The proposed taxonomy is 
comprised of four quadrants Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 as depicted in Figure 1. Each quadrant 
reflects the aggregate level of IS user cyber risk and their susceptibility to a social 
engineering attack. In the proposed risk matrix, there is direct relationship between the 
level of I-Type Cyber Curiosity and an inverse relationship with the level of Cyber SA 
and the resultant cyber risk to an organization.  
 The first quadrant, Q1, is labeled ‘Medium Cyber Risk’ because it consists of IS 
users with high D-Type Cyber Curiosity, low I-Type Cyber Curiosity and low Cyber SA 
score. IS users positioned in this quadrant maybe capable of reducing their likelihood of 
being susceptible to a successful social engineering attack by increasing their Cyber SA. 
The second quadrant, Q2, is labeled ‘Very High Cyber Risk’ because it consists of IS 
users with high I-Type Cyber Curiosity, low D-Type Cyber Curiosity, and low Cyber SA. 
Cyber risk in this quadrant is very high because IS users are more susceptible to a 
successful social engineering attack because of their high level of Cyber Curiosity and 
low SA of a possible cyber-attack. The third quadrant, Q3, is labeled ‘High Cyber Risk’ 
because it consists of IS users with high I-Type Cyber Curiosity, low D-Type Cyber 
Curiosity, and high Cyber SA. IS users positioned in this quadrant maybe capable of 
reducing their likelihood of being susceptible to a successful social engineering attack by 
decreasing their I-Type Cyber Curiosity and increasing D-Type Cyber Curiosity. The 
fourth quadrant, Q4, consists IS users with high D-Type Cyber Curiosity, low I-Type 
Cyber Curiosity and high Cyber SA and is labeled ‘Low Cyber Risk’. IS users, in this 
quadrant, are keen of social engineering tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 
meaning that they will be the least susceptible to a successful future attack. 
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Research Questions 
The main research question that this proposed study will address is: Does the 
measured level of IS Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity assist in the determination of a 
maritime IS user's susceptibility of a social engineering cyber-attack? In addition, this 
proposed study will address five specific research questions as follows:  
 
RQ1a: What are the SMEs identified components of the measures of an IS user’s 
level of Cyber SA which may influence the susceptibility of being a victim 
of a social engineering cyber-attack? 
RQ1b: What are the SMEs identified components of the measures of an IS user’s 
level of Cyber Curiosity which may influence the susceptibility of being a 
victim of a social engineering cyber-attack? 
RQ2a: What are the specific scores of the SMEs identified components of the IS 
user’s measures of Cyber SA that enable a validated hierarchical 
aggregation to the Cyber SA measure of the Cyber Risk taxonomy? 
RQ2b: What are the specific scores of the SMEs identified components of the IS 
user’s measures of Cyber Curiosity that enable a validated hierarchical 
aggregation to the Cyber Curiosity measure of the Cyber Risk taxonomy? 
RQ3: What are the experts’ approved classification of the Social Engineering 
Attack Experiment using the hierarchical aggregation of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity for the Cyber Risk Taxonomy using a social engineering 
attack experiment? 
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RQ4: How are the aggregated scores for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 
positioned on the Cyber Risk taxonomy for maritime IS users? 
RQ5a: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber SA based on their age, gender, nationality, 
department, years at performing job, education level, or psychological state 
of mind? 
RQ5b: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber Curiosity based on their age, gender, 
nationality, department, years performing job, education level, or 
psychological state of mind? 
RQ5c: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to an IS user’s 
Cyber Risk score based on their age, gender, nationality, department, years 
performing job, education level, or psychological state of mind? 
 
Relevance and Significance 
Relevance 
The purpose of this proposed study is to reduce the susceptibility of IS users being 
the victim of a social engineering cyber-attack. A review of the literature reveals that few 
studies have focused on Cyber SA as it relates to social engineering attacks. A multitude 
of the Cyber SA studies have focused on the role of IS users in cyber defense operations 
and analysis (Barford et al., 2010; Champion, Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012; 
Hoffman, Buchler, Doshi, & Cam, 2016). There has been limited work examining cyber-
attacks from a human-centric perspective such as the effectiveness of phishing attacks 
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(Hong, Kelley, Tembe, Murphy-Hill, & Mayhorn, 2013; Kelly, Hong, Mayhorn, & 
Murphy-Hill, 2012; Mancuso, Strang, Funke, & Finomore, 2014). Cyber Curiosity, as a 
term, has very limited research studies published. The nearest studies are those involving 
human elements of social engineering where curiosity is mentioned as one of the 
influencing factors. Identifying a possible link in how both Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity can help measure and predict the susceptibility of social engineering attack can 
be beneficial to the research community and organizations.  
Significance 
 This study can help advance current research in cybersecurity and contribute to 
the body of knowledge regarding IS users as it relates to their awareness of social 
engineering cyber-attacks. According to Verizon’s most recent Data Breach 
Investigations Report, social engineering attacks were used in 43% of all breaches with 
phishing and pretexting as the most common social engineering tactics (2018). The 
success rate of users clicking on phishing emails continues to rise. The success rate of 
users clicking on phishing emails was 30% and continues to rise year to year in 
comparing previous reports (Verizon, 2016). Despite the advancement of email security 
phishing detection and prevention technologies, social engineering phishing attacks 
continues to be a prevalent and easy form of cyber-attack (Gupta, Tewari, Jain & 
Agrawal, 2016). A successful cyber-attack can have significant financial impacts to a 
business. According to a recently published security report by Cisco (2017), almost a 
quarter of the surveyed businesses found that organizations that experienced a successful 
cyber-attack lost business opportunities. Out of those impacted businesses, four in ten 
said those losses were substantial and one in five lost customers nearly lost 30% revenue 
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(Cisco, 2017). Insight into factors that influence IS users’ level of cybersecurity SA and 
Cyber Curiosity can help reduce the success rate of social engineering attacks.  
 Another significance of this study is the unusual context of the research setting. 
The maritime industry, specifically passenger vessels, present a unique research study 
environment where crew spend a significant amount of time in constant interaction with 
passengers and are also away from family for extended periods of time. This interaction 
and enclosed environment provides an interesting dynamic to cyber situational awareness 
and Cyber Curiosity research further contributing to the IS body of knowledge. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
 One potential barrier for this proposed study is obtaining permission to measure 
the Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity of maritime IS users. Another challenge is the 
continual introduction of new maritime IS users who are assigned to ships on a variable 
rotation of schedule such as eleven weeks on and eleven weeks off or have extended six-
month contracts with six weeks off. As new staff especially ship chief staff like captains 
and chief engineers are introduced, their support and approval will be required. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval is required to use maritime IS users as 
participants. Approval for this proposed study must be obtained prior to pursuing IRB 
approval. A third barrier is the duality of Cyber Curiosity. As identified in the literature 
review, Cyber Curiosity can be a motivating factor to gain knowledge (Litman, 2008) and 
improve Cyber SA (Hake, 2016) or it can be a weakness if an IS user is curious and 
clicks on a malicious email (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2016). A fourth barrier is 
validating and conducting the experiment to measure SA and Cyber Curiosity. Measuring 
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the internal level of Cyber SA and curiosity is challenging. Seminal SA research by 
Endsley (1995) identified the difficulty in assessing the extent observers can accurately 
rate the internal construct of SA. Measuring SA requires multiple techniques because the 
“actual internal level of SA cannot be accurately measured by observation alone” 
(Salmon, Stanton, Walker, & Green, 2006, p. 29). Conducting a Delphi technique to 
validate the experiment components can be time consuming (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). 
Identifying a group of Delphi experts who are equivalent in knowledge and experience 
can also be challenging. Developing an interactive Web-based application that captures 
IS user’s response to measure SA and Cyber Curiosity can be daunting. There are direct 
(such as accurate identification of a phishing email), indirect (curiosity level), and mental 
workload (decision making) measures that must be incorporated in the overall 
measurement plan (Wright, Taekman, & Endsley, 2004).  
 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
 The following are assumptions made for this proposed study: 
• Experiment approval and consent forms will be obtained from IS users participating 
in the survey and experiment. 
• There will be an adequate number of SMEs for the expert panel reviews in Phase 2 
and Phase 3. 
• Experiment participants will be engaged and will answer honestly to the survey and 
experiment. 
• All experiment participation will be voluntarily, and participants will have decision-
making autonomy and not feel obligated to participate. 
 
  
14 
Limitations 
 There are several research study limitations to the proposed study. The first is that 
the proposed interactive social engineering attack experiment can create artificial 
situations that do not represent real-life situations impacting the gathered data since the 
reactions of the participants may not be true indicators of their behaviors in a real 
environment. Leveraging previously encountered social engineering attacks in published 
research or documented archives for the interactive experiment limits the risks of not 
creating real-life scenarios.  
 A second limitation is in the validity of the methods of measuring Cyber Curiosity 
and Cyber SA during the interactive Web-based experiment. Validity and reliability 
would be at question if the interactive experiment was incorrectly recording the 
participants’ responses. To mitigate the risk of data collection methods, an expert panel 
of SMEs, using the Delphi technique, will review the proposed interactive experiment. In 
development research, a consensus building process such as the Delphi Process, can help 
establish the reliability and validity of the methods used (Ellis & Levy, 2010). 
 A third limitation is in the ability for a globally dispersed maritime workforce to 
participate in the experiment and data collection survey. A majority of the maritime 
participants will be sailing on a ship that has limited Internet connectivity and bandwidth. 
To limit the participating risk, the interactive Web-based experiment will need to be 
designed to limit bandwidth usage and duration to a minimum. 
Delimitations 
 A delimitation of this proposed study is limited to scope of the investigations of 
the two constructs, Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Another delimitation of this proposed 
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study is that the population is limited to the maritime industry as the study may present 
different experiment results at other types of industries. 
 
Definitions of Terms 
The following represent terms and definitions. 
Cyber Situational Awareness - The perception of cyber risk elements with respect to 
time and space, the understanding of their meaning, and anticipation of their status in the 
near future (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
Cyber – Involving, using, or relating to computers, especially the Internet (Cambridge, 
n.d.).  
Cybersecurity – The protection of cyberspace, the electronic information, the 
infrastructure that supports cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their personal, 
societal, and national capacity including any of their interests that are vulnerable to 
attacks originating in cyberspace (Solms & Niekerk, 2013).  
Cyber Curiosity - Cyber Curiosity is the desire for information and knowledge about 
information systems (IS) and the Internet. 
Epistemic Curiosity – Epistemic curiosity is a state of arousal that impels the search for 
knowledge that can only be relieved by the acquisition of knowledge (Berlyne, 1960).  
Information Systems– A collection of multiple pieces of information involved in the 
dissemination of information. Hardware, software, computer system connections and 
information, information system users, and the system’s housing are all part of an IS 
(Technopedia, n.d.).  
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Maritime industry – Enterprises engaged in the business of designing, constructing, 
manufacturing, acquiring, operating, supplying, repairing and/or maintaining vessels. 
Also enterprise operating shipping lines, and customs brokerage services, shipyards, dry 
docks, marine railways, marine repair shops, shipping and freight forwarding services 
and similar enterprises (PwC, 2016). 
Operational Technology (OT) – Devices, sensors, software and associated networking 
that monitor and control shipboard onboard systems (BIMCO, 2016).  
Phishing attack - A criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and 
technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account 
credentials (APWG, 2016). 
Social engineering - A technique used by hackers, leveraging human interactions or 
social skills, to obtain or compromise IS information to infiltrate an organizations 
network (US-CERT, 2016). 
Subject Matter Expert (SME) – A highly knowledgeable individual who performs 
specialized functions in given organizational processes (Encyclopedia, n.d.).  
 
Summary 
 This proposed study will address the threats to organizations due to limited Cyber 
SA of socially engineered cyber-attacks (Cyberkeel, 2012; ENISA, 2011; Dhamija, 
Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Herzberg, 2009) and natural human curiosity (Iuga, Nurse, & 
Erola, 2016; Fan, Lwakatare, & Rong, 2016) by empirically testing measures for levels of 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Therefore, by using an expert validated set of Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity measure components, scores, and Web-based experiment, this study 
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will establish and validate a set of measurable Cyber SA and curiosity levels. Given the 
likelihood of IS users being the victim of a social engineering cyber-attack (Cisco, 2017; 
Verizon, 2018), this study will develop and empirically validate an IS cyber situational 
awareness (SA) taxonomy in the context of Cyber Curiosity that can be used as a 
benchmark to measure the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social 
engineering techniques among IS users. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
In this section, a literature review is presented to provide a synopsis of the 
relevant literature pertaining to areas and theories that provide a theoretical foundation 
for this proposed study. The main areas are social engineering, cyber situational 
awareness, Cyber Curiosity, and activity theory. This literature review will include the 
four characteristics mentioned, by Levy and Ellis (2006), which are 1) methodically 
analyze and synthesize quality literature, 2) establish a firm foundation for the research 
topic, 3) establish a solid foundation to the selection of research methodology, and 4) 
demonstrate that the proposed research is a novel contribution to the overall body of 
knowledge. To improve on the quality of the literature review, peer reviewed academic 
papers from reputable sources were used. Whenever appropriate, seminal researcher’s 
material were included to provide historical or foundational. 
 
Social Engineering 
 Social engineering can be considered the “art of persuasion” (Mitnick, 2002), 
influencing people to aid hackers to achieve their goal of gaining access to corporate IS 
systems. Most social engineering techniques are used to compromise IT while attacking 
individuals (Algarni, Xu, & Chan, 2015). Many organizations acknowledge the 
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importance of predicting and controlling social engineering, but a multitude fail to reach 
that goal (Brody, 2012). Social engineering malware propagates through a variety of 
infiltration channels such as email, social media Websites, portable storage devices, and 
mobile devices (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010).  
Phishing 
An email phishing attack is a form of social engineering where an attacker uses an 
email to send a malicious attachment or web link to a victim with the intent of tricking 
the recipient to open an attachment (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2016). In opening the 
attachment or clicking on the web link, the attacker attempts to steal the victims network 
account credentials or infect their machine with malware. There are many forms of email 
phishing attacks like broad target botnet-generated spam phishing to targeted spear-
phishing. A spear-phishing is targeted toward a specific user, organization or 
demographic (Heartfield & Loukas, 2016). In a PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) survey, 
phishing has “emerged as a significant risk to businesses of all sizes and across industry” 
(2017, p. 9) and re-emergence of traditional social engineering tactics. In one month, 
phishing was estimated to have caused $282M in global losses (RSA, 2014). Verizon 
Enterprise Solutions (2017) reported that attackers leverage email as the primary means 
of communication to the target, followed by in-person deception, and phone calls. The 
attackers’ primary goal in the social phase of an attack is the installation of malware or 
disclosure of credentials (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2017). IS user’s failure to report 
suspicious emails also impacts an organization’s ability to increase Cyber SA. In an 
annual data breach investigative report, Data Breach Investigative Report (Verizon 
Enterprise Solutions, 2016), of the approximately 636,000 confirmed phishing emails, 
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approximately 3% of targeted individuals alerted management of a possible phishing 
email. Increasing employee Cyber SA is a critical and often neglected arsenal in 
cybersecurity preparedness (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017).  
Business Email Compromise 
 Business email compromise (BEC) is a sophisticated scam targeting organizations 
and IS users with the intention of committing fraud or obtaining sensitive information 
such as financial wire transfers, personally identifiable information (PII), undisclosed 
proprietary data, or user credentials (FBI, 2018). BEC attackers rely on social 
engineering tactics like impersonation to trick unaware IS users (TrendMicro, 2016). 
According to TrendMicro (2016), there are three common types of phishing BEC scams. 
One type is the “Bogus Invoice Scheme” that involves an organization that has an 
established relationship with a supplier and the attacker asks to wire funds for a bogus 
invoice payment. A second type of BEC is “CEO Fraud” where an attacker impersonates 
a high-level executive and requests, via email, an urgent time-sensitive wire transfer to an 
unsuspecting employee. The third type of BEC attack is “Data Theft” is a compromised 
email account of a role-specific employee that the attacker uses to send emails with the 
goal of obtaining sensitive information from other IS users. Data theft BEC attacks are 
difficult to detect since the email is coming from a legitimate employee circumventing 
cybersecurity awareness training SA advice to check for legitimate senders.  
 BEC phishing cyber-attacks is a growing and evolving issue for organizations 
regardless of its size. The Internet Crime Compliance Center (IC3), FBI’s center for users 
to submit complaints of Internet crime, since its inception, has received about 4 million 
complaints resulting in $5.52 billion in losses (FBI, 2017). In a 2017 analysis report, 
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researchers at SecureWork’s Counter Threat Unit (CTU) identified a BEC social 
engineering scheme led by a threat group named GOLD GALLEON targeting the 
maritime shipping industry (Secureworks, 2018). GOLD GALLEON is a collection of at 
least 20 criminal associates collectively carrying out BEC campaigns. These types of 
groups are able to successfully exploit IS users by using publicly available malware such 
as inexpensive or free remote access trojans (RATs) and crypters to avoid malware 
detection tools (Secureworks, 2018). 
Impersonation 
As mentioned in the BEC section, a type of impersonation, social engineering 
cyber-attack is called “CEO Fraud” where an attacker impersonates a high-level 
executive and requests an urgent time-sensitive wire transfer to an unsuspecting IS user. 
In an impersonation phishing attack, an attacker first compromises or spoofs the email of 
an executive or business partner. In both cases the goal is for the attacker to exploit the 
trust of the IS user receiving the email to them to divulge targeted information or process 
a requested bogus transaction (Tripwire, 2017). In the 2017 Internet Crime Report, BEC 
accounted type attacks for 15,690 victims with a loss of $675 million (FBI, 2017). Many 
of these BEC attacks leveraged impersonation as the means of successfully exploiting the 
victims. 
Combating social engineering phishing attacks requires organizations to develop 
shared social responsibility and not solely rely on technical solutions (Abraham & 
Chengular, 2010). Increasing Cyber SA of social engineering attacks can significantly 
reduce the likelihood of being a victim of an attack (Bullée, Montoya, Pieters, Junger, & 
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Hartel, 2015). A summary of research studies regarding social engineering are listed in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
Summary of Social Engineering Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution  
Abraham & 
Chengalur-
Smith, 2010 
Literature review 
and synthesis 
 Social 
engineering 
malware 
proliferation 
through a 
variety of 
infiltration 
channels such 
as e-mail, social 
software, 
websites, and 
portable media 
Social engineering 
malware is both 
pervasive and 
persistent. 
Emphasized the 
importance for 
organizations to 
develop a shared 
social responsibility 
to combat social 
engineering 
malware and not 
solely on technical 
solutions 
 
Algarni et 
al., 2015 
Scenario-based 
experiment 
377 
participants 
in the 
experiment 
Social 
engineering 
victimization 
and the 
perceived 
sincerity, 
competence, 
attraction, and 
worthiness of 
source 
The results of this 
study showed that 
every factor of the 
perceived sincerity, 
competence, 
attraction, and 
worthiness of a 
source are 
significant 
predictors of 
susceptibility to 
social engineering 
victimization. 
Perceived sincerity 
was found to induce 
the most influence 
on users’ judgment 
toward accepting or 
rejecting social 
engineering-based 
attacks 
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Situational Awareness 
SA has received considerable attention from the psychology and human factors 
research communities over the past 20 years. Although the original impetus for research 
came from military aviation, it has now developed into a critical research theme in almost 
any domain that involves humans performing tasks in complex, dynamic systems. SA 
research is widespread and ongoing in a variety of domains, including military operations 
(Endsley & Garland, 2000; Matthews, Pleban, Endsley, & Strater, 2000), aviation (Kaber, 
Endsley, Wright, & Warren, 2002; Keller, Lebiere, Shay, & Latorella, 2004), air traffic 
control (Hauss & Eyferth, 2003; Endsley & Smolensky, 1998), and automotive (Zheng, 
McConkie & Tai, 2004). In recent years SA research has also been extended to the cyber 
Table 1 
Summary of Social Engineering Literature (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
 
Bullée et al., 
2015 
Empirical study 
via controlled 
experiment 
118 
participants 
in the 
experiment 
Intervention and 
effect of 
authority in 
social 
engineering 
attack 
A training 
(intervention) of the 
risks security 
engineering attacks 
reduced the 
probability of a 
successful attack by 
almost half versus 
those not exposed to 
the training 
 
Heartfield & 
Loukas, 2016 
Survey  Social 
engineering 
semantic attacks 
Introduced a 
structured baseline 
for classifying 
semantic attacks by 
breaking down into 
components and 
identifying 
countermeasures 
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domain in cyber defense (Barford et al., 2010), modeling detection (Dutt, Ahn, & 
Gonzalez, 2013) and industrial control systems (Hoffman et al., 2016).  
SA in aviation 
There have been numerous research studies of SA in aviation. In a controlled 
experiment conducted of 16 pilots by Kaber, Endsley, Wright, and Warren (2002), it was 
discovered that workload automation of flight controls may compromise pilot situational 
awareness after a critical event as compared to manual flight operation. In another 
longitudinal study spanning four years of SA and demands of short-term memory system, 
Isaac (2017) research confirmed previous studies that short-term memory is capable of 
storing information for a few seconds without active rehearsal, but that short-term 
memory has also limited capacity unless a controlled process like repeating information.  
SA in automobile safety 
 SA has been used in automobile safety by various studies. In one empirical study 
using a driving simulation experiment by Zeng, McConkie, and Tai (2004), SA and 
awareness of a car driver identified that vehicle location is coarsely remembered in 
driver’s memory. This investigation helped explain why drivers fail to notice a 
decreasing distance to the car ahead resulting in rear-end collisions. Benefits of driving 
training and improving SA where studied by Walker, Stanton, Kazi, Salmon, and Jenkins 
(2008) where they demonstrated that drivers who undergo advanced driving training 
show an increase in the number of new information elements that comprise their SA.  
SA in maritime industry 
 In the maritime industry SA studies have focused primarily on safety. In a study 
of offshore drilling personnel (N=378) on stress levels and its impact on SA, the 
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researchers discovered that higher levels of stress and fatigue are linked to lower levels of 
work SA (Sneddon, Mearns & Flin, 2012). In another study of dynamic position 
operators SA and decision-making, operators chose to follow predetermined procedures, 
in accordance with their training, to avoid accidents and rectify the situation whenever 
automation systems no longer function properly (Øvergård, Sorensen, Nazir, & 
Martinsen, 2015). 
Goal oriented situational awareness 
  SA is a concept widely used to understand individuals reasoning in highly 
dynamic technical systems in safety-critical domains such as aviation, military operations 
and maritime (Westrenen & Praetorius, 2014). A goal-oriented definition of situational 
awareness requires what must be known to solve a class of problems encountered when 
interacting with a dynamic environment. In this view, SA is viewed as the “capacity to 
direct consciousness to generate competent performance given a particular situation as it 
unfolds” (Smith & Hancock, 1995, p. 138). The cognitive side of SA relates to human 
capacity of being able to comprehend the technical implications, for example 
navigational system displays, and draw conclusions to derive informed decisions.  
 Endsley and Jones (2016) identified three levels of SA. The first level is 
perception (Level 1 SA), second level comprehension (Level 2 SA), and third level 
projection (Level 3 SA). Level 1 SA is the perception of cues that is used to form a 
picture of the situation. Level 2 SA is comprehension which is the integration of multiple 
pieces of information and their relevance to a person’s goal. A person with Level 2 SA 
“been able to derive operationally relevant meaning and significance from the Level 1 SA 
data” (Endsley & Garland, 2000, p. 6). Level 3 SA is the highest level of SA which is the 
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ability for a person to forecast future situation events. According to Endsley and Garland 
(2000), “experienced operators rely heavily on future projects. It is the mark of a skilled 
expert” (p. 6). Figure 2 shows a model of SA in dynamic decision making.  
 
Figure 2. Model of SA in dynamic decision making adopted from Endsley (1995) 
SA Perception, Comprehension, and Projection Elements in Different Domains 
 SA perception, comprehension and projection examples vary by type of job 
domain (i.e. navigation officer, chief engineer, and cybersecurity operational technology 
(OT) engineer). The three elements of SA can be defined by SMEs in the domain who 
can provide what they consider important using goal-oriented task analysis processes 
(Endsley & Jones, 2012). A listing of examples of the three SA elements by job domain 
are listed in Table 2. A summary of research studies regarding situational awareness are 
listed in Table 3.  
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Table 2 
Examples of Perception, Comprehension, and Projection Elements for Different Job 
Domains (Adapted from Endsley, 2015). 
 
Domain Perception Comprehension Projection 
Vessel Navigation 
Officer 
Ship location Impact of 
weather on 
itinerary 
Predicted changes in 
visibility 
Ship Navigation 
Officer 
System failures 
or downgrades 
Ability to reach 
alternate port 
Projected impact of 
changes on safety of vessel 
Vessel Chief 
Engineer 
Scheduled 
outages 
Effected vessel 
systems 
Projected impact on vessel 
systems adding or 
removing element 
Vessel Chief 
Engineer 
Power load 
levels 
Confidence 
level in 
parameter 
values 
Potential for voltage 
collapse 
Cybersecurity OT 
Engineer 
Malware 
detected in OT 
system 
Behavior of 
malware in OT 
system 
Projected impact of 
malware on vessel systems 
Cybersecurity OT 
Engineer 
Suspicious 
network 
activity in OT 
network 
Behavior of 
network activity 
to OT systems 
Projected impact of 
systems in OT network  
 
Table 3 
Summary of Situational Awareness Literature 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrume
nt or 
Construct 
Main Finding or Contribution 
Dutt et al., 
2013 
Simulation 
using 
modeling 
techniques 
 Cyber 
situation 
awareness 
It is important to train defenders 
with cases involving multiple 
threats that will improve threat-
prone memory and prepare 
defenders with impatient 
attackers 
Endsley & 
Garland, 
2000 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 
 Situation 
awareness 
Provides a comprehensive 
overview of situation awareness 
and an analysis of nine different 
approaches to measuring 
situational awareness 
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Table 3 
 
Summary of Situational Awareness Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Endsley & 
Jones, 
2016 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 User-
centered 
design and 
situation 
awareness 
A comprehensive book on 
user-centered design to 
improve situational 
awareness   
 
 
 
Endsley & 
Smolensky, 
1998 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Situational 
awareness 
SA awareness focusing on 
air traffic controllers (ATC) 
providing SA requirements 
for ATC and measuring and 
evaluating SA 
 
Hauss & 
Eyferth, 
2003 
Simulation 
using 
modeling 
techniques 
 Situation 
awareness 
measurement 
A new on-line probe SA 
assessment technique was 
developed (SALSA) for air 
traffic management that is 
more applicable than 
previous measurement 
models like SAGAT 
 
Hoffman et 
al., 2016 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Situation 
awareness in 
industrial 
control 
systems 
Highlight specific 
challenges created by 
physical, cyber, and people 
risks that must be 
understood for analyst to 
defend against potential 
industrial control systems 
cyber attacks 
 
Isaac, A., 
2017 
Empirical 
study via 
controlled 
experiment 
34 flight 
radar 
controllers 
Situation 
awareness 
and demands 
on short-term 
memory 
Situational awareness is 
sensitive to the demands of 
the short-term memory 
system. Immediate 
problems encountered by a 
radar controller will be to as 
a result of limitations of 
short-term memory 
 
Table 3 
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Summary of Situational Awareness Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Kaber et 
al., 2002 
Empirical 
study via 
controlled 
experiment 
16 
private 
pilots 
Situation 
awareness 
and levels of 
automation 
(LOA) 
Workload automation may 
compromise pilot situational 
awareness after a critical event 
as compared to manual flight 
control 
Keller, et 
al., 2004 
Simulation 
using 
modeling 
techniques 
 
 Human 
performance 
modeling 
 
Study demonstrate that 
existing human performance 
modeling tools can be used to 
predict the situational 
awareness of systems designed 
to provide information to 
human operators in high 
workload or high-risk 
environments 
 
Matthews 
et al., 2000 
Theoretical  Situation 
awareness 
measurement 
Development of situation 
awareness measurement rating 
scales and a SA self-
assessment questionnaire. 
 
Øvergård 
et al., 2015 
Accident 
review and 
analysis 
24 
critical 
incidents 
Situation 
awareness 
and decision 
making 
Identified that dynamic 
position operators chose to 
follow predetermined 
procedures, in accordance with 
their training, to avoid 
accidents and rectify the 
situation whenever automation 
systems no longer function 
properly 
Smith & 
Hancock, 
1995 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Risk space 
and 
situational 
awareness 
Introduces the concept of risk 
space to represent the invariant 
relations in the environment 
that enable an agent to adopt to 
novel situations and to attain 
prespecified goals 
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Table 3 
 
Summary of Situational Awareness Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Sneddon et 
al., 2012 
Empirical 
study via 
questionnaire 
378 
offshore 
drilling 
personnel 
Work 
situational 
awareness 
and stress 
levels 
Higher levels of stress and 
fatigue are linked to lower 
levels of work SA 
Van 
Westrenen 
& 
Praetorius, 
2014 
Comparison 
and contrast 
analysis 
 Maritime 
traffic 
situation 
awareness  
Critically reviewed SA and 
how it has been defined and 
measured in various 
domains. Argued that freeze 
techniques are an inadequate 
way of assessing operator’s 
situation awareness 
 
Walker et 
al., 2008 
Longitudinal 
study with 
analysis 
75 
drivers 
Situational 
awareness 
and advanced 
driving 
Drivers who undergo 
advanced driving training 
show an increase in the 
number of new information 
elements that comprise their 
SA 
Zheng et 
al., 2004 
Empirical 
study via 
driving 
simulator 
experiment 
17 adults Situation 
awareness of 
auto driver 
Vehicle location is coarsely  
represented in driver’s 
memory and is used to 
visually monitor more fine-
grained location information 
that helps explain why 
drivers fail to notice a 
decreasing distance to the 
auto ahead resulting in rear-
end collisions 
 
Cyber Situational Awareness 
 Cyber SA, in the context of this proposed study, is the perception of cyber risk 
elements with respect to time and space, the understanding of their meaning, and 
anticipation of their status in the near future (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). Cyber SA is a 
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subset of situational awareness that deals with the “cyber” environment (Franke & 
Brynielsson, 2014). An IS user’s increased level of Cyber SA may be dependent on the 
level of experience in threat detection and awareness. Decision support tools and human-
computer interaction design have been areas of research to aid IS analysts in increasing 
Cyber SA. For example, Erbacher et al., (2010) developed a task-flow diagram using 
collected feedback such as processes, goals, and concern from IS network analysts. 
Erbacher (2012) also designed a visualization technique to aid decision makers in making 
rapid assessments and prioritization of identified cyber anomalies. Along similar 
research, Mahony et al. (2010) used cognitive task analysis to design a cyber situational 
awareness tool. In contrast to the abundance of traditional SA in improving human 
decision making (Van Westrenen & Praetorius, 2014), less research has been devoted to 
IS user SA because recent research has focused on tools (Jonker, Langevin, Schretlen, & 
Canfield, 2012) or specialized training for security analysts (Ahrend, Jirotka, & Jones, 
2016). A summary of research studies regarding cyber situational awareness are listed in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 
 
Summary of Cyber Situational Awareness Literature 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Ahrend et 
al., 2016 
Qualitative 
data gathering 
and analysis 
using semi-
structured 
interviews 
Five 
interviewees 
Development 
of threat and 
defense 
knowledge to 
increase 
Cyber SA 
Analyzed and describe 
the tacit knowledge, 
practices, skills, and 
tools that IS 
practitioners use to 
create and utilize threat 
and defense knowledge 
(TDK) to improve 
Cyber SA  
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Table 4 
 
Summary of Cyber Situational Awareness Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Erbacher, 
2012 
Case study Interviews 
with network 
analysts and 
network 
managers 
Cyber 
situational 
awareness 
Created a next generation 
situation awareness 
visualization technique of 
cyber data to improve 
cyber decision-making 
challenges 
Franke & 
Brynielsson, 
2014 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 
 
 Cyber 
situational 
awareness 
 
Thorough literature review 
of Cyber SA consisting of 
analysis of 102 articles by 
clustering them by 
category such as industrial 
control systems, 
emergency management, 
tools, architectures, and 
algorithms 
Jonker et 
al., 2012 
Developmental 
research 
 
 Visual 
analytics 
and cyber 
situational 
awareness 
Demonstrated the use of 
visualization tools of "big 
data" to increase cyber 
situational awareness 
Mahony et 
al., 2010 
Developmental 
research 
Analytically-
driven 
knowledge 
acquisition 
sessions with 
operational 
SMEs 
Cyber 
situational 
awareness 
Developed a list of 
preliminary Cyber SA 
categories that can help 
drive the design and 
development of a SA tool 
 
 
 
Tadda & 
Salerno, 
2010 
Survey with 
analysis 
 
 Metrics for 
measuring 
the 
capability 
supporting 
cyber 
situational 
awareness 
A thorough analysis of 
metrics that can be mapped 
to SA reference model to 
help evaluate the quality of 
performance measures 
consisting of four 
dimensions: confidence, 
purity, cost utility, and 
timeliness 
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Curiosity and Cyber Curiosity 
Historically there have been many attempts at defining curiosity. Hume (1888) 
distinguished between curiosity as a passion for scientific discovery and the innate, 
human nature curiosity such as the “insatiable desire of knowing the action and 
circumstances of their neighbors” (p. 237). Cicero viewed curiosity as a passionate act, 
human nature’s innate love of learning and knowledge without the lure of profit (Elster, 
2000). Modern psychologist defined curiosity as an appetite for knowledge (Lowenstein, 
1994). Curiosity is often considered the desire to gain information, which, in turn, results 
in exploratory behavior and knowledge acquisition (Berlyne, 1960, 1963). Further work 
into knowledge acquisition’s link to curiosity led to Lowenstein’s (1994) development of 
a knowledge-gap model that focuses on curiosity as resulting from the identification of 
unknown pieces of information. According to Lowenstein (1994), there are two 
dimensions of curiosity, one epistemic and perceptual and the other, specific and diverse. 
Epistemic curiosity (EC) refers to a desire for information and knowledge (Berlyne, 
1960). Litman and Jimerson’s (2004) analysis of Berlyne’s formulation of EC, identified 
that “unpleasant state of uncertainty” (p. 1586) were more important for motivating 
knowledge seeking than “pleasurable states of interest.” (p. 1586). From this analysis, 
Litman and Jimerson (2004) identified two types of curiosity based on interest induction 
(I) and deprivation (D) elimination. I-type curiosity involves the pleasure of new 
discoveries, whereas D-Type is concerned with reducing uncertainty and eliminating 
unwanted states of ignorance (Litman, 2008).  
Lowenstein (1994) considered the greater motivator for knowledge seeking to be 
uncertainty reduction versus anticipation of learning something interesting not taking into 
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account individual differences (Litman, Hutchins & Russon, 2005). Litman and Jimerson 
(2004) further theorized that there are also individual differences in the types of emotions 
people experience when their curiosity is aroused whether as a result of pleasurable 
feelings of interest or unpleasant experience of uncertainty. In an empirical study of EC 
of 321 undergraduate students by Litman, Hutkins, and Russon (2005), the findings 
suggested that when “participants felt more distant from the desired knowledge, curiosity 
was both less intense and also involved more positive emotions; when they felt close to 
figuring out the knowledge, curiosity was more intense, but also less pleasant” (p. 578). 
In Cyber SA context, D-Type curiosity can help IS users develop more awareness 
about cyber threats such as a phishing attack if they are uncertain or ignorant of the 
indicators or impact of a social engineering attack. I-Type curiosity, in contrast, can 
create an opportunity for a social engineering cyber-attack by using curiosity to lure users 
to clicking on a web link or visit a website. Cyber Curiosity in this context is the desire 
for information and knowledge about information systems (IS).  
A better understanding of Cyber Curiosity and a possible link to reducing risks 
(Hake, 2016) such as a social engineering attack might assist organizations in designing 
more effective Cyber SA programs or in identifying personality characteristics that help 
with cybersecurity job requirements (Libicki, Senty, & Pollack, 2014). A summary of 
research studies regarding curiosity and Cyber Curiosity are listed in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
 
Summary of Curiosity and Cyber Curiosity Literature  
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Berlyne, 
1960, 
1963 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Exploratory 
and epistemic 
behavior 
Increases the knowledge 
of concepts and 
principles of exploratory 
and epistemic behavior 
Elster, 
2000 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Constraint 
theory 
People may benefit from 
being constrained in their 
options from being 
ignorant 
Hume, 
1888 
Treatise 
 
Human 
nature 
A comprehensive attempt 
to base philosophy on a 
new, observationally 
grounded study of human 
nature  
Libicki 
et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study via 
interviews 
and literature 
review and 
synthesis 
Interviews 
with 
representatives 
of 5 U.S. 
government 
organizations 
Cybersecurity 
labor market 
In addressing 
cybersecurity resource 
gaps companies are 
defining personality 
characteristics notably 
intense curiosity to help 
identify potential 
candidates 
Litman, 
2008 
Empirical 
study via 
questionnaires 
2660 
undergraduate 
students 
Interest (I-
type) and 
deprivation 
(D-type) 
curiosity 
The results of the study 
helped clarify the 
differences between I-
type and D-type 
epistemic curiosity (EC). 
I-type EC is concerned 
with adding new ideas to 
improve intellectual 
mastery while D-type EC 
reflects an unsatisfied 
need-like state that 
motivates exploration 
and performance-
oriented learning goals. 
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Table 5 
 
Summary of Curiosity and Cyber Curiosity Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Litman et 
al., 2005 
Empirical 
study via 
questionnaires 
265 university 
students 
Epistemic 
curiosity 
Further substantiation 
of previous research 
by Lowenstein (1994) 
that exploration of 
knowledge is more 
strongly motivated 
when the goal is to 
reduce feelings of 
uncertainty rather than 
to increase feelings of 
interest 
Litman & 
Jimerson, 
2004 
Empirical 
study via 
questionnaires 
321 
undergraduate 
students (248 
women, 73 
men) 
Curiosity as a 
feeling of 
deprivation 
(CFD) and 
feeling of 
interest (CFI) 
CFD and CFI are 
psychometrically 
distinguishable 
constructs but overlap 
substantially in 
relation to epistemic 
curiosity 
Lowenstein
, 1994 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Curiosity A new account of 
curiosity as a form of 
cognitively induced 
deprivation that comes 
from the perception in 
a gap in knowledge 
 
Activity Theory 
History of Theory 
 Activity theory originated in the 1920’s and was developed by a group of Russian 
psychologists. Activity theory threefold origins come from classical German philosophy, 
in the writing of Marx and Engels, and in the Soviet Russian cultural-historical 
psychology of Vygotsky, Leont’ev, and Luria (Engestrom, Miettinen, & Punamaki, 
1999). Throughout activity theory’s history, three generations of activity theory 
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developed. The first generation was influenced in the 1920’s and 1930’s by Vygotsky, 
focused on the individual and culture. Vygotsky (1978) proposed that humans deeply 
understand the things around them and acquire knowledge through their meaningful 
actions, interaction and other social activities. 
The second generation led by Leont’ev (1978, 1981), focused on collective 
activity, mediational means, and division of labor as the basis of historical processes. 
Activity theory was introduced into an international audience in the late 1970’s through 
Leontʹev’s English translation of Activity, Consciousness, and Personality (1978). 
Broadly defined, activity theory “is a philosophical and cross-disciplinary framework for 
studying different forms of human practices as development processes, which both 
individuals and social levels interlink at the same time” (Kuutti, 1995, p. 23). Activities 
are at the center of human behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and these activities are 
actions and operations that people perform to achieve a desired outcome (Hasan & 
Crawford, 2003).  
The third generation, led by Engeström and Cole, gravitated towards dialogue, 
multiple perspectives, and cultural diversity (Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 1999). 
Cole and Engeström further refined the concept of an activity by adding there is also a 
transformation of the relationship between the subject and object through their interaction 
(Salomon, 1997). Luria (1928) asserted a similar observation that tools “radically change 
his conditions of existence, they even react on him in that they effect a change in him and 
his psychic condition (p. 493). The basic structure of human cognition that develops from 
tool mediation and widely known representation of activity theory (AT) is the triadic 
schema shown below (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Activity theory triadic schema adopted from Engeström (2006). 
At the most basic level, the concept of an activity is the “purposeful interaction of 
the subject with the world” (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006, p. 31), resulting in a mutual 
transformation (Outcome) between the subject and object (Leontiev, 1978). Kaptelinin 
and Nardi (2006) described activity as the “basic unit of analysis providing a way to 
understand subject and objects, an understanding that cannot be achieved by focusing on 
the subject or object separately” (p. 3). 
Evolution of Theory 
According to activity theory, not any entity is a subject. Subjects have needs that 
can be met by being and acting in the world (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006). In other words, 
subjects live in the world. Tools in activity theory are not limited to physical artifacts. 
Vygotsky (1978) made no distinction between things that only exists in the mind from 
physical artifacts. According to Vygotsky (1978)’s expanded definition of a tool, 
curiosity or situational awareness would function as tools to accomplish a particular 
outcome. For example, a Subject includes a user who accesses (Activity) a website with a 
computer (Object) to learn (Outcome) something new (Curiosity) but uses cyber 
situational awareness (Tool) to avoid suspicious websites. Bedny and Meister (1999) 
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linked activity theory with situational awareness by stating that “the goals in the theory of 
activity are closely related to notions of expectations, forecasting, anticipation, or 
extrapolation” (p. 64). Activity theory has been used in numerous studies and 
applications, such as in mobile learning (Hsu & Ching, 2013), information sharing 
systems (Alhefeiti, 2018), personal learning environments (Buchem, Attwell, & Torres, 
2011), and the maritime industry (Viktorelius & Lundh, 2019). 
Activity Theory Use in the Maritime Industry 
In a study by Viktorelius and Lundh (2019), activity theory was used as the 
framework in analyzing contradictions and tensions in the work practices onboard ships 
following the implementation of energy monitoring. In using activity theory in this 
research study, a better understanding of sociotechnical change processes were identified. 
In another study, activity theory was used to identify interface design human factor issues 
that impacted situational awareness during remote ship monitoring (Man, Weber, 
Cimbritz, Lundh, & MacKinnon, 2018). 
Activity Theory Use in Safety and Other Industries 
Recent empirical research by Vries and Bligård (2019), demonstrates activity 
theory as a useful model in navigational safety assessment and design. Their research 
leverage linked activity triangles to show the advisory relationship between pilots 
(Subject) local knowledge and foresight (Tools), and safe navigation (Goal) with the 
vessel’s crew. A relationship established by Vries and Bligård (2019) was linking activity 
triangles between goals of one actor may be used as a tool by another actor. This linking 
can be extended to more complex activity triangle relationships. In a longitudinal 
observation research focusing on mobile workforce (Francisco, Klein, Engestrom, & 
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Sannino, 2018), activity theory framework was used to create supportive learning 
pathways for mobile workers performing knowledge intensive activities. A summary of 
research studies regarding activity theory are listed in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Summary of Activity Theory Literature  
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Alhefeiti & 
Abdulla, 
2018 
Case study 32 
participants 
Activity 
theory-based 
information 
sharing 
analysis 
Developed a 
systematic approach to 
the design of 
information sharing 
systems 
Allen et 
al., 2013 
Empirical 
research 
50 semi-
structured 
interviews 
Critical 
realism and 
activity 
theory 
Demonstrated that 
critical realism and 
activity theory are 
essential to IS 
research 
Bedny & 
Meister, 
1999  
Case study  Situation 
awareness 
Situation awareness 
must be viewed as part 
of cognitive activity 
that is intensely 
dynamic 
Buchem, et 
al., 2011 
Scientific 
analysis of 
publications 
100 
publications 
Personal 
learning 
environments 
(PLE) and 
activity 
theory 
Created a better 
understanding of PLEs 
and developed a 
knowledge base to 
inform further 
research 
Engeström, 
Miettien, 
& 
Punamäki, 
1999 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Activity 
Theory 
Comprehensive 
overview, history, and 
theoretical 
background of 
Activity Theory 
Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 
1975 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Attitude Activities are at the 
center of human 
behavior. 
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Table 6 
 
Summary of Activity Theory Literature (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Francisco, et 
al., 2018 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Activity theory 
and expansive 
learning 
Theoretical 
contribution of 
exploring expansive 
learning in mobile 
work to analyze 
practices of knowledge 
creation and sharing. 
Kaptelinin 
& Nardi, 
2006 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Activity 
Theory 
A systematic entry-
level introduction to the 
major principles of 
activity theory and 
applied to our 
relationship with 
technology. 
 
Kuutti, 1995 Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Human-
Computer 
Interaction and 
Activity 
Theory 
Paper discusses the 
potentials of activity 
theory as an alternative 
framework for HCI 
research and design. 
Leontʹev, 
1978 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Activity and 
consciousness 
Demonstrates the 
primacy of Marxists 
methodology in the 
resolution of 
fundamental problems 
of contemporary 
psychology 
Luria,1928 Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
  Cultural development 
Viktorelius 
& Lundh, 
2019 
Case study  Energy 
efficiency and 
cultural-
historical 
activity theory 
A better understanding 
of the social technical 
change processes can 
be achieved if the 
existing practitioners 
every day practices 
paradoxes are 
examined 
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IS User Activity Theoretical Framework 
 A solid theoretical framework “identifies and defines the important variables in 
the situation that are relevant to the problem and describes and explains the 
interconnections among the variables” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 78). The IS user 
activity system model illustrated in Figure 4 adopts activity theory to investigate the 
relationship between IS users (Subject), Cyber Curiosity (Tool), Cyber SA (Tool), actions 
(Object) and outcome (Goal). Figure 4 adapts the triangular activity system developed by 
Engeström (1990) that is considered a valuable descriptional framework for use and 
analysis of technologies (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4. The IS user activity system model adopted from Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006) 
 
Demographic Indicators 
Age 
 Age has been a demographic indicator in research related to curiosity, social 
engineering, and situational awareness. A study by Robinson, Demetre and Litman 
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(2017), showed a decline in epistemic curiosity, an intellectual desire for new knowledge, 
from early to late adulthood. Age-related declines in exploratory behavior are also 
evident in animal research (Collier et al., 2004). Motivational factors also affect curiosity 
at various ages. According to socioemotional selectivity theory (SST), when individuals 
are young, they tend to focus on information seeking goals over emotion-regulation goals 
in preparation for the uncertain future. In contract, older people tend to favor emotion-
regulation goals and optimization of their psychological wellbeing. This focus in 
emotion-regulation goals at older age is due to their perception that time is limited 
(Sakaki & Murayama, 2018). In summary, previous studies in personality psychology, 
animal behavior, and social psychology confirm that curiosity declines with advanced 
age.  
 There have been numerous studies that have identified age-related cognitive 
declines and its impact to situational awareness. In evaluating the impacts of aging in 
situational awareness, one type of intelligence, fluid intelligence, declines as an 
individual age (Caserta & Abrams, 2007). For example, driving in an unfamiliar city 
during high traffic requires fluid intelligence to deal with the rapid processing of new 
information. Age-related declines in the perception of rich relevant cues impact level 1 
situational awareness (Korteling, 1993; Salthouse, 1991). Level 2 and 3 SA also suffer 
from age-related declines due to the increased load in working memory (Bolstad, 2001). 
 
Years performing job 
 In the maritime industry, the years performing job may influence detection of a 
social engineering cyber-attack or improve their cyber situational awareness. Asher and 
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Gonzalez (2015) examined the knowledge gap between experts and novices in 
cybersecurity and how it influences their ability to detect cyber-attacks. Experts do better 
when their decisions relate to their judgement and when under static as compared to 
dynamic stimulus. Along similar previous research findings, experience makes an expert 
more attuned to cues that are overlooked by a novice (Randel, Pugh, & Reed, 1996). 
Beyond experience, situated knowledge, knowledge specific to an organization or 
operating environment may offer an additional layer of situational awareness to detect 
cyber-attacks beyond just years of experience in performing a particular job (Goodall, 
Jutters & Komlodi, 2004).  
Gender 
 Gender has been studied as a demographic indicator in research related to 
curiosity, social engineering, and situational awareness. In one study by Huang, Wang, 
Zhou, and Zhang (2010), there were no significant differences observed in epistemic 
curiosity between males and females. In a study by Anwar et al. (2017), they observed 
gender differences in security self-efficacy, where women's mean self-efficacy score was 
0.95 standard deviations lower than men's mean ratings. Further research is warranted 
whether gender has an influence on Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. 
Nationality 
National culture is defined as the “values, beliefs, and assumptions learned in 
early childhood that distinguishes one group of people from another” (Testa, 2002, p. 
427). One particular maritime industry, the cruise industry, capitalizes on sourcing its 
human resources in an environment that is hierarchical in organization and nationality 
structure. Weaver (2005) generalized that the lowest ranking employees are usually from 
  
45 
Eastern Europe, Central America, and Southeast Asia. Middle ranking crew such as 
supervisors are frequently from eastern and western Europe. While higher ranking crew 
members are from wealthier countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, 
or Australia. A summary of research studies regarding demographic indicators are listed 
in Table 7. 
Table 7 
 
Summary of Demographic Indicators Literature  
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Anwar et 
al., 2017 
Cross-
sectional 
survey study 
481 students Cybersecurity 
behaviors and 
gender 
Gender has effect in 
security self-efficacy, 
prior experience, and 
computer skills and 
minimal effect in cues-
to-action and self-
reported cybersecurity 
behaviors 
 
Ben-
Asher & 
Gonzalez
, 2015 
Experiment 
and 
questionnaire 
55 students; 
20 security 
professional
s 
Dynamic 
decision 
making, 
intrusion 
detection 
system 
A better understanding 
of the human decision-
making process in the 
detection of cyber-
attacks. Experts do well 
in tasks where the 
stimulus is static. 
Performance of 
detecting cyber-attacks 
where similar for 
experts and novices 
 
Bolstad, 
2001 
Driving 
simulator 
experiment 
48 
participants 
Situational 
awareness and 
age 
Older adults have lower 
SA and with increasing 
complexity they are 
more susceptible to a 
narrowing of attention  
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Demographic Indicators Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Collier et al., 
2004  
Experimental 
research 
344 rats Spatial 
learning and 
age 
Discovery of age 
related reduction in 
neurotransmission 
resulting in deficits in 
spatial learning and 
memory performance 
 
Goodall et 
al., 2004 
  Intrusion 
detection and 
expertise 
Effective intrusion 
detection requires 
expertise that 
combines deep 
understanding of 
networking, system 
behavior, and situated 
knowledge of the 
local operating 
environment.  
 
Huang, et al., 
2010 
Survey and 
data analysis 
2871 
students 
Epistemic 
curiosity 
Boys and girls 
experience and 
express both I-type 
EC and D-type EC to 
the same extent and 
frequency, 
invalidating any 
biased gender-based 
expectation 
 
Korteling, 
1993 
Experiment 28 adults Dual-task 
performance 
and age 
Further substantiated 
the slowing-
complexity 
hypothesis that 
general slowing 
causes age effects to 
increase with overall 
task complexity   
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Demographic Indicators Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Randel et 
al., 1996  
Experiment 28 warfare 
technicians 
Situation 
awareness and 
naturalistic 
decision making 
Experts were more 
proficient in 
recalling radar 
emitters and their 
ability to make 
correct decision 
based on better SA 
 
Robinson 
et al., 2017 
Quasi-
experimental 
design 
963 adults Curiosity and 
age 
Individuals in the 
crisis period of 
various age groups 
were more curious 
(D-type) than those 
of the same life stage 
 
Sakaki & 
Murayama
, 2018  
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Cognitive 
preservation and 
aging 
Despite that 
curiosity declines 
with age, it plays an 
important role in 
maintaining 
cognitive function, 
mental health, and 
physical health in 
older adults 
 
Salthouse, 
1991 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Cognitive 
functioning and 
age 
Reviewed and 
evaluated the major 
explanations 
proposed to account 
for the negative 
relationship between 
age and cognition 
 
Testa, 
2002 
Survey and 
data analysis 
367 cruise 
line 
managers 
Multiculturalism 
and dyad 
congruence 
National culture 
systematically 
impacts how 
subordinates 
evaluate and feel 
about their leaders 
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Demographic Indicators Literature (Cont.) 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Weaver, 
2005 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Performative 
metaphors 
Performance 
metaphors can be 
used to explain the 
difficult conditions 
and circumstances 
that cruise-ship 
service employees 
work 
 
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in the Literature 
 A review of literature provides an overview of important constructs such as Cyber 
SA, Cyber Curiosity, and foundational theories that include activity theory all of which 
provide the foundation for this proposed study. A detailed description of what is known 
and unknown is included in this literature review. The following paragraph gives a 
summary of what is known and unknown within this area of research. 
 In information security, users are the weakest link (Anderson, 1993; Boss, Kirsh, 
Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; Mahfuth, Yussof, Baker, & Ali, 2017). Attackers 
exploit this fact using social engineering (Mouton, Leenen, & Venter, 2016). IS user 
curiosity can lead to compromise and safety of systems such as in baiting types of 
socially engineered attacks where the user is enticed by a gift or reward (Fan, Lwakatare, 
& Rong, 2017). In contrast, IS user curiosity can possibly improve IS security by users 
being more aware of social engineering attacks. Lack of Cyber SA limits an IS user’s 
ability to detect a social engineering cyber-attack. Increasing Cyber SA, as demonstrated 
in other domains such as medical, transportation, driving safety, may improve IS users 
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awareness of potential cyber-attack and reduce cyber incidents. The medical and 
transportation domains have benefitted from situational awareness simulation training to 
improve perception ability. A recent medical SA study by Chang et al. (2017), resulted in 
modest differences between simulation training versus lecture training on SA. What is 
unknown is whether increasing Cyber SA for individuals with a propensity to engage in 
risky activity such as surfing questionable websites, clicking on email links without 
worrying about the ramifications can lower their risks. In similar studies of SA analyzing 
offshore drilling accidents and unsafe work behaviors, showed a positive relation to the 
safety of non-compliance workers with a history of unsafe behaviors (Sneddon, Means, & 
Flin, 2013). A review of the literature associated with Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 
seems to indicate that these two constructs likely impact the susceptibility and success of 
a social engineering attack. However, limited research on these relationships has been 
conducted and as a result, additional research is warranted.   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Overview of Research Design 
This research study used a developmental approach. A developmental research 
approach was an appropriate approach because the study required developing a Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity risk taxonomy to address an identified problem. According to Ellis 
and Levy (2009), developmental research attempts to answer how the building of an 
artifact ameliorates a problem. A comparison approach was also used to better understand 
the relationship between the constructs of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Figure 5 shows 
the research design consisting of three phases for this research study. Developmental 
research has three essential elements: 1) creating and validating the criteria the product 
must meet; 2) following an accepted process for developing a product; 3) subjecting the 
product to an accepted process to assess if it satisfies the criteria (Ellis & Levy, 2009). 
This research design process began with the exploration of the literature to identify a 
research problem that led to the formulation of research questions. This was followed by 
the identification and proposal for the initial classification of components for the 
measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. After this initial exploration and formulation 
stage, the research study transitioned to the first phase of three phases. In Phase One, the 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measures and scores used in the Cyber Risk taxonomy 
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was validated by SMEs’ input utilizing the Delphi method. In Phase Two, of this research 
study, using the validated Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity components and scores, a 
proposed interactive social engineering attack experiment was SME validated utilizing 
the Delphi method. At the beginning of Phase Three, a successful pilot testing of the 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measures was conducted. Phase Three then proceeded 
with data collection, pre-analysis data screening, and data analysis. The entire research 
study culminated with the conclusions and recommendations. Figure 5 shows the 
research design for this research study.  
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Figure 5. Research Design Process 
 
Phase One 
Prior to beginning Phase One, this research study obtained site approval and 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval as seen in Appendix A and B respectively. 
Phase One of this research SMEs reviewed the proposed measure components and scores 
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of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The SMEs review used the Delphi technique, to 
review and validate the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy: 1) components for the measures 
of Cyber SA; 2) components for the measures of Cyber Curiosity levels; and 3) the scores 
of the identified components of the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. A target 
group of nine SMEs were solicited to participate in the review using Google Formsâ to 
gather the data (See Appendix C & Figure 6). The SMEs background included a mixture 
of cybersecurity and cyber maritime experts with at least ten years of professional 
experience. The expert panel questionnaire began with an explanation of the 
questionnaire and the SMEs role in the research. The questionnaire then proceeded with 
SMEs demographics section to obtain their background and professional credentials. The 
last portion of the questionnaire, that collected the SME’s validation responses and 
feedback, had two parts. Part one consisted of validating the proposed components and 
scores for the measures of Cyber SA through a multiple-choice grid with rows to validate 
each component for the measures of Cyber SA. There was multiple choice option to 1-
Keep, 2-Adjust, or 3-Remove the proposed component. If the SMEs selected option 2 or 
3 then the SMEs would need to provide feedback on the recommended adjustments. Part 
two consisted of validating the proposed components and scores for the measures of 
Cyber Curiosity using a similar multiple-choice option with SMEs validation 
requirements. Phase One concluded with successfully addressing research RQ1a, RQ1b, 
RQ2a, and RQ2b by successfully getting a consensus on the proposed Cyber Risk 
taxonomy. 
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Figure 6. Phase 1 - Research design to review and validate proposed measure 
components and proposed scores of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 
Phase Two 
Phase Two SME validated the proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy using a 
consensus-building process implementing the Delphi technique. A target group of seven 
SMEs were solicited to participate in the review using Google Formsâ to gather the data 
(See Appendix F & Figure 7). The SMEs background included a mixture of cybersecurity 
and cyber maritime experts with at least ten years of professional experience. The expert 
panel questionnaire began with an explanation of the questionnaire and the SMEs role in 
the research. The questionnaire then proceeded with SMEs demographics section to 
obtain their background and professional credentials. The last portion of the questionnaire 
collected the SME’s validation responses and feedback. There was multiple choice option 
to 1-Keep, 2-Adjust, or 3-Remove the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy components. If the 
SME selected option 2 or 3 then the SMEs would need to provide feedback on the 
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recommended adjustments. The successful review and validation of the Cyber Risk 
Taxonomy concluded Phase 3 with addressing RQ3. 
 
Figure 7. Phase 2 Research design to review and validate proposed classification for the 
Cyber Risk Taxonomy 
Phase Three 
Phase Three began with a pilot test of the Web-based experiment using a mixture 
of qualitative and quantitative data collection, to assess measures of Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity. Minor adjustments were made to the experiment based on the feedback from 
the pilot experiment. After minor refinements were made to the experiment, Phase Three 
successfully conducted a quantitative empirical study by collecting Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity data from 120 maritime IS and 54 shoreside IS users. Lastly, the collected data 
was analyzed to address RQ4, RQ5a, RQ5b, and RQ5c. The research methodology 
required several issues to be addressed including: 1) expert panel validation of Cyber 
Risk taxonomy; 2) experiment development; 3) experiment validity; 4) experiment 
reliability; 5) sampling strategy; 6) pre-analysis data preparation; and 7) data analysis. 
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The main research question that this research study addressed is: Does the measured level 
of IS Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity assist in the determination of a maritime IS user's 
susceptibility of a social engineering cyber-attack? The research context in this proposed 
study will be Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity in the maritime industry. The maritime 
industry is an ideal environment to study Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity because 
maritime IS users must rely on SA to safely operate and navigate a ship. The maritime 
system “is a people system, and human errors figure prominently in casualty situations” 
(Rothblum, 2000, p. 1). Bridge officers frequently rely on SA using IS systems and their 
surroundings to make quick decisions when navigating in inclement weather or when 
safely piloting through a condensed port (Chauvin & Lardjane, 2008; Olsson & Jansson, 
2007).  
 
Experiment Development 
This research study Web-based interactive experiment consisted of four steps (See 
Figure 8) that took between 15 through 20 minutes for participants to complete. Step one 
began with an audio and presentation overview of the research study that took less than 
two minutes to complete. Step two required the participants to review and electronically 
sign the informed consent form that took approximately two minutes to complete. Step 
three gathered the participant’s demographics by requesting the participant to fill out a 
Google Form® pre-experiment survey that consisted of two sections. Step three took less 
than 3 minutes. Section one, as illustrated in Appendix I, gathered demographic items 
from the survey participants consisting of age range (D1), gender identification (D2), 
nationality (D3), department (D4), years performing job (D5), and education level (D6). 
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Section two of the survey gathered participants psychological state of being consisting of 
two items P1 and P2 using a four-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “nearly 
every day.” The rationale for these survey items were described in the literature 
demographics section.  
 
Figure 8. Research Study Experiment Steps 
 
After the survey form was submitted, step four began with the two-part interactive 
Web-based experiment took less than 13 minutes to complete. The first experiment 
collected the participants Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity D-Type measures by presenting 
a simple social engineering scenario that integrated the measures of the two constructs: 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity (D-type). The second portion of the experiment collected 
the participants Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity (I-Type) by presenting an advanced social 
engineering scenario that integrated the measures of the two constructs: Cyber SA and 
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Cyber Curiosity (D-Type & I-Type). See Figure 9 for the conceptual design of the Cyber 
SA and Cyber Curiosity measurement approach. 
 
 
Figure 9. Conceptual design of the Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measurement 
approach 
Expert Panel & Delphi Technique 
The use of an expert panel using the Delphi technique was used validate the 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measures and scores and the Web-based experiment. The 
Delphi method assists with construct validity (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). The Delphi 
technique has been used to develop a range of possible alternatives, to explore underlying 
assumptions leading to different judgments, to seek out information which may generate 
a consensus on the part of the respondent group, and to correlate informed judgements on 
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a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafon, 1975). 
There are three characteristics associated with the Delphi method which are anonymity, 
controlled feedback, and aggregations of responses. There are typically three to four 
rounds used in the Delphi method but three is sufficient to collect needed information and 
reach a consensus (Brooks, 1979; Custer, Scarcella, & Steward, 1999). The first round 
begins with an open-ended questionnaire that solicits specific information from the SMEs 
(Custer et al., 1999). An acceptable modification to round one of the Delph method is to 
use a structured questionnaire that is based upon an extensive review of the literature 
(Kerlinger, 1973). The second round the SMEs are required to rank-order items to 
establish priorities among items and to reach consensus or disagreement among items 
(Ludwig, 1994). In this study, the first and second round were combined into a two-part 
questionnaire structured questionnaire and a rank-order of items for the SMEs to validate 
the components for the measures and scores of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity constructs. 
In Delphi reviews where complete consensus was achieved in earlier rounds, additional 
rounds was not necessary as the number of Delphi iterations depends on the degree of 
consensus sought by researchers and can vary (Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson, 
1975).  
Pilot Testing 
Prior to data collection, the proposed pre-experiment survey and experiment was 
reviewed by an expert panel and a pilot test was conducted on a subset of the sample 
population. Ten IS users were used in the pilot to assess the measures of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity. A pilot is defined as an experimental investigation (Hawker & Waite, 
2007) that allows the researcher to test of the methods and procedures to be used later on 
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a larger scale. Conducting a pilot test is one of the most important steps in successful 
quantitative research because it provides a preliminary assessment of the theory (Dennis 
& Valacich, 2001) including identifying areas where the proposed experiment may be 
complicated and fail (Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). Furthermore, the pilot experiment 
further substantiate that the experiment was valid and reliable before its implementation 
to the experiment sample. Appendix E provides the pilot study recruitment email used to 
enlist participants. Prior to beginning the pilot test, a consent form as seen in Appendix F 
was acknowledged and signed.  
Measuring Cyber Situational Awareness 
Several methods for measuring SA have been developed. The SA data collection 
approaches are self-rating technique (McGuiness & Foy, 2000; Matthews & Beal, 2002), 
observer rating (Matthews & Beal, 2002), freeze online probe (Endsley, 1995; Hauss & 
Eyferth, 2003), performance measures, real-time probe (Jeannott, Kelly, & Thompson, 
2003), post-trial questionnaire (Jeannott et al., 2003) and physiological measurement 
techniques (e.g. eye tracking devices). The majority of such measures often use 
simulators (Wright, Taekman, & Endsley, 2004). Other than simulators, SA data 
collection methods have used post task completion SA rating questionnaires where 
respondents rate factors affecting their performance and understanding to provide a 
global measure of SA (Taylor, 1990). Freeze probe techniques require the administration 
of SA queries online during ‘freezes’ in a simulation of the task under analysis (Salmon 
et al., 2009). For this proposed study, a freeze probe technique was used to gather IS user 
responses from the social engineering attack, interactive Web-based Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity experiment. Time is the factor that was used to measure the level Cyber SA. 
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The advantages of using freeze probe is that it is a direct approach, subject to number 
validation studies, and removes challenges with collecting SA post-trail data (Salmon et 
al., 2006). Performance measures to assess Cyber SA involved measuring relevant 
aspects of the IS participant performance during the Web-based experiment (i.e. 
identification of phishing attack indicators). For each correct identification of a social 
engineering attack type indicators the participant gets a point. Table 8 and Table 9 shows 
the SMEs validated Cyber SA measurement points for each correct attack identification 
and the duration for the identification of the attack. 
Table 8 
Cyber SA Measurement Points (CSA-m) 
Experiment User Action Categories Points 
Simple social engineering attack identified 1 
Advanced social engineering attack identified 2 
Unable to identify social engineering attack or no response 0 
Incorrect social engineering attack identified -1 
 
Table 9 
Cyber SA Time Measurement Points (CSA-tm) 
Level Experiment User Action Timing Categories Points 
A
dv
an
ce
d 
Advanced social engineering attack identified under 10 seconds 4 
Advanced social engineering attack identified between 10 
seconds and 20 seconds 
2 
Advanced social engineering attack identified longer than 20 
seconds 
0 
Si
m
pl
e 
Simple social engineering attack identified under 10 seconds 2 
Simple social engineering attack identified between 10 seconds 
and 20 seconds 
1 
Simple social engineering attack identified longer than 20 
seconds 
0 
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Measuring Cyber Curiosity 
In the context of this research study, the two types of epistemic curiosity (EC) 
were measured I-Type (interest induction) and D-type (deprivation elimination). I-Type 
EC deals with the pleasure of new discoveries and diverse exploration. D-Type EC is 
concerned with reducing uncertainty, eliminating unwanted levels of ignorance, aimed at 
solving problems, and setting performance-oriented learning goals (Litman, 2008). Two 
EC measurements used in curiosity research are the Epistemic Curiosity Scale (ECS) 
(Litman & Spielberger, 2003) and the Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation Scale 
(CFDS) (Litman & Jimerson, 2004). An adaption of the ECS and CFDS EC measurement 
using an indirect versus direct (questionnaire or survey) will be used for this proposed 
experiment.  
Cyber Curiosity I-Type and D-Type measurements were taken during the Cyber 
SA interactive Web-based experiment. Both I-Type and D-Type Cyber Curiosity 
measurements were obtained by keeping track of the various Web links the participants 
click on during the interactive experiment. I-Type and D-Type curiosities are inversely 
related in terms of scoring Cyber Curiosity. I-Type curiosity reduces Cyber Curiosity 
scores while D-Type increases Cyber Curiosity scores. For example, if the participant 
clicked on a simple explanation of identifying a social engineering attack, they got a 
negative point (D-type curiosity). If the participant clicked on a more in-depth 
explanation, they got negative 2 points (D-Type curiosity). If the participant clicked on a 
Web link that was potentially malicious, they got a point increased (I-Type curiosity). 
Table 10 shows the SMEs validated Cyber Curiosity measurement points per action 
selected. 
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Table 10  
Cyber Curiosity Measurement Points  
 Curiosity Type  
Experiment User Action Selection I-Type D-Type Points  
Simple explanation (User was presented with link to 
expand on explaining the section of the experiment 
such as “Learn more about Phishing Email 
Situational Awareness”) 
  
 x -1 
In-depth explanation (User was presented with a link 
in the simple explanation section to seek further 
information such as “To learn further information 
about Phishing Email Situational Awareness”) 
 x -2 
 
Enticing Web link (User was presented with a link to 
a non-SA awareness page with an entertaining story 
or topic) 
 
x  1 
Enticing Pop-up Web link (User was presented with a 
pop-up to a non-SA awareness page with an 
entertaining story or topic) 
x  2 
 
Reliability and Validity 
Instrument Validity 
 Validity in research refers to the researches ability to infer meaningful and 
justifiable inferences from data about a sample or population (Creswell, 2005). Validity 
of an instrument refers to the degree an instrument measures what it is supposed to 
measure (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). To ensure the validity and reliability of the Web-
based experiment and surveys, a panel of SMEs reviewed the proposed interactive social 
engineering attack experiment to measure Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. A pilot was 
also conducted to test the experiment and gathered measures to refine the experiment 
based on the results. 
 
Internal Validity 
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 Internal validity is the confidence placed in the cause-and-effect relationship or 
more simply stated, “To what extent does the research design permit us to say that the 
independent variable causes a change in a variable” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 174). 
This study leveraged SA experimental techniques previously used by notable researchers 
in SA. To further reduce the threats to internal validity, an expert panel reviewed and 
validated the experimental procedures and scorings.  
External Validity 
 External validity is the extent of generalizability of the results of a causal study to 
other environments, people, or events (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Because research study 
gathering data in a field experiment and not in a controlled, lab environment, this 
approach increases the external validity. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), field 
experiments have more external validity meaning that the results are more generalizable 
to similar organizational settings. 
Construct Validity 
 Construct validity “testifies to how well the results obtained from the use of the 
measure fit the theories around which the test is designed” (Sekeran & Bougie, 2013, p. 
227). Incorporating the validation of a measure can help substantiate research findings, as 
well as “move the IS field forward toward meaningful replicated studies” (Straub, 1989, 
p. 162). This research study focused on two constructs, Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. 
Using published measures for similar constructs such as situational awareness and 
curiosity improved the “goodness” of the measure (Sekeran & Bougie, 2013). Requiring 
feedback from SMEs, using the Delphi technique, ensured that the criteria used in the 
method of measuring Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity was further validated.  
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Instrument Reliability 
 The Web-based experiment was designed to accurately measure levels of Cyber 
SA and Cyber Curiosity. To increase the reliability of the experiment, detailed logging 
was enabled to track the measured points for both Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. These 
captured measurements were compared with the expected results and compared with 
what was being recorded. Further measurement calculations were validated during the 
pilot testing of 10 users to make sure that experiment data recorded was accurately and 
reliably sent to Amazon’s DynamoDB NoSQL database. A manual, visual inspection of 
each participants measurements were validated to what was observed during the 
experiment. There was a risk to instrument reliability in this experiment in that it utilized 
an interactive Web-based experiment that needed to use a provided computer and satellite 
Internet. To increase reliability, several performance tests were conducted on the 
experiment site (ship) to identify the minimum requirements for the computer and 
Internet speed. To improve the performance and higher reliability of the cyber SA timed 
measures, non-essential components to the experiment were removed such as the audio 
overview of the experiment and high-resolution graphics. To test for internal consistency 
a mixture of split-half, Cronbach Coefficient Alpha, or Kuder-Richardson correlation 
tests were used.  
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Population and Sample 
The population of the study is approximately 1,200 maritime IS users in the 
marine operations, hotel operations, and shipboard information technology (IT) 
departments. A randomized selection of the sampling frame was the sample of the study. 
A sample size of 174 IS users was used to support the validity and generalization of the 
results. To further increase the generalizability of the study, the sample group, due to the 
global nature of the maritime industry, had diversity such as nationality, education level, 
department, and number of years performing job. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 Prior to data analysis, pre-analysis of data was performed on the data collected 
from the SMEs and the experiment participants. Levy and Ellis (2006) recommend pre-
analysis data screening to prevent data collection issues. This research study had two 
forms of quantitative data gathered from the pre-experiment survey and interactive Web-
based experiment with the sample participants to measure the two constructs, IS user 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Using the demographics information and personal mood 
data gathered from the pre-experiment survey using Google Forms, this set of additional 
data was measured and analyzed against the two constructs. The measures from the 
experiment will be plotted on the Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Cyber Risk taxonomy.  
Data Aggregation 
 The measurement of IS participants Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity required 
measuring relevant aspects of the IS participant performance during the interactive Web-
based experiment such as the identification of a phishing attack or an IS participant 
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clicking on a Web-link. This research study required three data aggregations. The first 
data aggregation was calculating overall Cyber SA. Equation 1 (Eq. 1) was used to 
compute the total Cyber SA score for each experiment participant. 
Eq. 1           𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑆𝐴	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	 = 	∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑚2)24 + 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑡𝑚2) 
 
Here 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑚2) is the average specific score of the SMEs identified components of the IS 
user’s measures of Cyber SA. 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑡𝑚2) is the average specific score of the SMEs 
identified components of the IS user’s time measurement of Cyber SA. 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑡𝑚2) is the 
specific score of the SMEs identified components of the IS user’s time measurement of 
Cyber SA. And n is a specific Cyber SA experiments, which is two (2) in this study. The 
second data aggregation was calculating overall Cyber Curiosity. Equation 2 (Eq. 2) was 
used to compute the total Cyber Curiosity score for each experiment participant. 
Eq. 2           𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	 = 	∑ 𝐶𝐶(𝑚2)24  
 
Here 𝐶𝐶(𝑚2) is the average specific score of the SMEs identified components of the IS 
user’s measures of Cyber Curiosity. And n is the specific Cyber Curiosity experiments, 
which is two in this study. The third data aggregation, the Cyber Risk score, is the 
product of the overall Cyber SA and Curiosity score adjusted scores (transformations). 
Such transformation was needed, given that two components of the measures had a range 
of scores from negative to positive. Thus, the transformations conducted unable the 
overall product to represent accurately the magnitude of the specific measures combined. 
Equation 3 (Eq. 3) was used to compute the total Cyber Curiosity score for each 
experiment participant. 
Eq. 3           𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = <𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑆𝐴	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + (1 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑆𝐴)@ ×	(𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + (1 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐶)) 
 
  
68 
Here 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑆𝐴 is the minimum value for the Cyber SA score range and 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐶 is = the 
minimum value for the Cyber Curiosity score range. 
Research Question 4 (RQ4) 
 The fourth research question determined where the IS users are positioned in the 
Cyber Risk taxonomy based on their Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measurements 
captured in the interactive Web-based experiment. RQ4 is stated as: 
RQ4: How are the aggregated scores for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 
positioned on the Cyber Risk taxonomy for the maritime IS users? 
Analysis of RQ4 was determined by calculating the aggregates for Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity and plotting the values on the Cyber Risk taxonomy (2x2 matrix). As described 
earlier, each quadrant represents one of the four groups labeled “Low Cyber Risk”, 
“Medium Cyber Risk”, “High Cyber Risk” and “Very High Cyber Risk.”   
Research Question 5 (RQ5) 
The fifth research question determined if there were any statistically significant 
mean differences to IS users aggregated Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity levels, and Cyber 
Risk score based on the captured demographics in the pre-experiment survey (See 
Appendix I & J) such as age range, gender identification, nationality, department, years 
performing job function, or education level. RQ5 is stated as: 
RQ5a: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber SA based on their age, gender, department, 
years performing job function, or education level? 
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RQ5b: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber Curiosity based on their age, gender, 
department, years performing job function, or education level? 
RQ5c: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to an IS user’s 
Cyber Risk score based on their age, gender, department, years performing 
job function, or education level? 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), it is necessary to include a frequency 
distribution for demographic variables. This research study included a tabulation to 
compute an IS user’s Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity aggregated score based on their 
gender, age, nationality, department, years performing job function, and education level. 
This research used the means of the aggregated scores for the two constructs, Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity, to analyze RQ5a-RQ5b and tests the significance of group 
differences using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). To calculate the Cyber Risk 
score to analyze RQ5c and tests the significance of group differences using one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), the product of the adjusted Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity was used. According to Mertler and Vannatta (2010), ANOVA is the 
appropriate statistical test to evaluate differences when there is one dependent variable 
(DV) with two or more categories and multiple quantitative independent variables IVs. 
The IVs in this research study are the demographics indicators D1-D6. The given that 
there were two independent DVs, Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity, as well as one 
integrated multiplication of the two, the Cyber Risk score, ANOVA was conducted three 
times. The first ANOVA1 analyzed Cyber SA and the IVs (age, gender, nationality, 
department, years performing job, and education level). The second ANOVA2 analyzed 
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Cyber Curiosity and the same set of IVs. The third ANOVA3 analyzed the IS user’s 
Cyber Risk score and the IVs (age, gender, nationality, department, years performing job, 
and education level). In addition, a t-test was used to help further evaluate differences 
between the two groups (maritime vs. shoreside) based on the IS users aggregated levels 
of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). 
Resources 
 In order to complete this research study, the following resources were used: 
• Access to a pool of maritime IS users:  An adequate sample of IS maritime 
responsible for ship operations was recruited from a passenger vessel. This 
sample was accessible and approved through experiment site and IRB approval.  
• Expert panel:  This research required an expert panel of industry and academic 
professionals in the IS cybersecurity field. Feedback from the expert panel was 
used to validate the experiment used to measure the constructs of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity.  
• Statistical analysis tool:  A statistical analysis tool (SPSS) was used to analyze the 
data gathered and compile the results.  
• Google Formsâ: A cloud-based tool was used to develop the expert panel 
qualitative survey, consent forms, and pre-experiment survey instrument. 
• Amazon AWS: An infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) platform was used to host 
the Web-based interactive experiment. The technology components consisted of 
an Apache web server, a MySQL database, a gateway API for the client-side 
script to submit experiment responses, a AWS S3 data storage to store the results 
of the Google Formsâ and the experiment data (AWS DynamoDB).  
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• Technology:  A mixture of tools such as hardware, software, networking, and 
library resources was used to facilitate the communication with advisor and 
committee, researching the literature, and writing the dissertation report. 
Summary 
In closing the methodology section, Chapter Three detailed the research design, 
experiment development, a review of the population and sample, data analysis and 
aggregation. Concluding with a summary of the research questions posed and resources 
used to carry out research. This research study consisted of three phases culminating in 
the analysis and responding of the four research questions (RQ4, RQ5a, RQ5b, & RQ5c) 
with a conclusion and recommendations for future research. The main goal of this 
research was to design, develop, and to empirically validate an IS Cyber SA in the 
context of Cyber Curiosity that measures the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack 
using social engineering techniques on maritime IS users.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Overview 
This chapter contains the results and data analysis conducted in this research 
study. In Phase One of this research, SMEs reviewed the proposed measure components 
and scores of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Phase One concluded with addressing 
research questions RQ1a, RQ1b, RQ2a, and RQ2b. Phase Two involved the SMEs, who 
validated the proposed interactive social engineering attack experimental procedures to 
measure Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity using the Delphi technique. Phase Two 
concluded with addressing RQ3. Phase Three began with a pilot test of the experiment to 
assess the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Needed adjustments were made to 
the experiment based on the feedback from the pilot experiment. After refinements were 
made to the experiment, Phase Three completed the analysis of Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity data from 120 maritime IS and 54 shoreside IS users. The data that was 
gathered and analyzed addressed RQ4, RQ5a, RQ5b, and RQ5c.  
 
Qualitative Research and Expert Panel (Phase One) 
 The beginning of Phase One consisted of a Delphi Method data collection method 
using a well-structured questionnaire based on literature review of Cyber SA and Cyber 
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Curiosity filled out by cybersecurity SMEs to validate the proposed measure components 
and scores for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. It is an acceptable and common 
modification of the Delphi review to use a structured questionnaire versus open ended 
questionnaire (Kerlinger, 1973; Hsu & Sanford, 2007). For Phase One, the SMEs were 
solicited from LinkedIn professional contacts working in the maritime and cybersecurity 
industry. The SMEs data collection was started in early August 2019 and was completed 
by the end of August 2019.  
Phase One – Data Collection 
 The goal for this phase of the study was to complete an expert panel solicitation to 
review and validate the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy using a consensus-building 
process implementing the Delphi technique. Upon data collection, the SMEs reviewed 
and validated the following: 
1. Components for the measures of Cyber SA and experimental procedures 
2. Components for the measures of Cyber Curiosity levels and experimental 
procedures 
3. The scores of the identified components of the measures of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity  
A group of nine SMEs participated in the review and validation using an online 
questionnaire to gather the data. The SMEs background were mixture of cybersecurity 
and cyber maritime experts with at least ten years of professional experience. The 
questionnaire consisted of two parts. Part 1 consisted of three sections (A, B, & C). 
Section A gathered the SMEs validation of the components for the measures of Cyber 
SA. Section B gathered the validation for scores for the identified components of Cyber 
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SA. The last section C of Part 1 gathered the time scores for identified components of the 
measures of Cyber SA. The second part of the questionnaire consisted of only two 
sections (A & B). Part 2 Section gathered the SMEs validation of the components for the 
measures of Cyber Curiosity. Part 2 Section B gathered the validation for scores for the 
identified components of Cyber Curiosity. 
Phase One – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
 Prior to beginning data analysis, pre-analysis data screening was conducted on the 
data collected from the SMEs. Pre-analysis data screening needed to be conducted to 
prevent data collection issues (Levy & Ellis, 2006), ensure accurate data is collected and 
there are no missing or outlier data values (Mertler & Vannatta, 2012). SMEs responses 
were collected using Google Formsâ. To ensure data integrity, editing of data was 
prevented after submission from the participants. To ensure data completely, each 
question in the SMEs review was required to be filled in prior to submission. Pre-analysis 
data screening was done by saving the collected data to Google’s spreadsheet. In 
Google’s spreadsheet, the collected data has the submitted timestamp and responses 
entries for secure storage and retrieval. On performing pre-analysis data screening, only 
one outlier response out of the nine was identified and removed since the data submitted 
in free form had a response that was not able to be understood (Part 1 – Section C, P1-C4 
feedback).  
Phase One – Expert Panel Characteristics 
 Upon completing pre-analysis data screening, demographic analysis was 
performed on the collected SMEs Questionnaire (See Appendix D). Demographic 
information collected from the SMEs included gender, age, level of education, number of 
  
75 
professional certifications, and years of professional experience. To qualify the expertise 
level of the SMEs, number of professional certifications, level of education, and years of 
professional experience were gathered to potentially remove SMEs responses who did 
not meet minimum requirements. For the SMEs that participated in Phase One, all of 
them had at least a Bachelor’s or Technical Degree, majority held one or more 
professional certifications, and more than 12 years of professional experience. 
Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics of the SMEs (n=9) 
Demographic Item Frequency Percent 
Gender   
 Female 1 11.1% 
 Male 8 88.9% 
    
Age Category   
 35-44 4 44.4% 
 45-54 5 55.6% 
Education   
 Bachelor’s Degree or Technical Degree 6 66.7% 
 Master’s Degree 3 33.3% 
    
Certifications   
 0 1 11.1% 
 1 5 55.6% 
 2 3 33.3% 
    
Years of Professional Experience   
 12-15 5 55.6% 
 >=16 4 44.4% 
    
 
Phase One – Data Analysis 
 The purpose of the SMEs two-part questionnaire was to validate the proposed 
components for the measures and scores of Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) and 
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Cyber Curiosity levels to help develop and empirically validate an IS Cyber Risk 
taxonomy in the context of cyber risk that can be used as a benchmark to measure the 
susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering techniques among IS 
users. Section A of Part One of the questionnaire asked the SMEs to provide feedback on 
the performance measures to assess Cyber SA measuring relevant aspects of the IS 
participant performance during the Web-based experiment (i.e. identification of phishing 
attack indicators). The SMEs were asked to review and validate the proposed Cyber SA 
components for the measures for each type of social engineering attack user action. Their 
options were to 1-Keep, 2-Adjust, or 3-Remove. For Section A, eight of the nine SMEs 
had a consensus to “Keep” the components for the measures of Cyber SA (See Table 12). 
Upon reviewing the feedback from the SMEs response to “Adjust”, the SME was making 
a clarification on the term ‘social engineering attack’ that did not impact the 
recommended components since the difference between ‘simple’ and ‘advanced’ were on 
the level of effort to craft an attack (sophistication) and the level of Cyber SA required 
for an IS user to identify an attack.  
Table 12 
SMEs Validation and Review of Cyber SA Components User Action 
 SMEs Responses (N=9) 
Experiment User Action Categories Keep Adjust Remove 
Simple social engineering attack identified 8 1 - 
Advanced social engineering attack 
identified 8 1 - 
Unable to identify social engineering attack 
or no response 8 1 - 
Incorrect social engineering attack 
identified 8 1 - 
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Section B of Part One of the questionnaire asked the SMEs to review and validate 
the measurement scores to assess Cyber SA measuring relevant aspects of the IS 
participant performance during the Web-based experiment. The SMEs were asked to 
review and validate the proposed Cyber SA scores for each type of social engineering 
attack user action. Their options were to 1-Keep, 2- Adjust, or 3-Remove. For Section B, 
there was 100% consensus from the SMEs to “Keep” the recommended scores for Cyber 
SA. Table 13 shows the Cyber SA User Action Score SMEs responses. 
Table 13 
SMEs Validation and Review of Cyber SA User Action Scores 
  SMEs Responses (N=9) 
Experiment User Action 
Categories Points Keep Adjust Remove 
Simple social engineering 
attack identified 1 9 - - 
Advanced social engineering 
attack identified 2 9 - - 
Unable to identify social 
engineering attack or no 
response 
0 9 - - 
Incorrect social engineering 
attack identified -1 9 - - 
 
Section C of Part One of the questionnaire asked the SMEs to review and validate 
the time measurement scores to assess Cyber SA measuring relevant aspects of the IS 
participant performance during the Web-based experiment. The SMEs were asked to 
review and validate the proposed Cyber SA time scores for each type of social 
engineering attack user action. Their options were to 1-Keep, 2-Adjust, or 3-Remove. For 
Section C, there was 90% consensus from the SMEs to “Keep” the recommended scores 
for Cyber SA. According to Green (1982) and Ulschak (1983), consensus on a topic can 
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be achieved by having at least 70% of the Delphi SMEs agree. One of the originally 
proposed timing scoring options removed which was “Unable to detect simple nor 
advanced social engineering attack” since that was replaced with the same scoring as 
“attack identified longer than 20 secs.” Table 14 shows the Cyber SA Time Measurement 
Score SMEs responses. 
Table 14 
 
SMEs Validation and Review of Cyber SA Time Measurement Scores 
  SMEs Responses (N=9) 
Level Experiment User Action 
Timing Categories Points Keep Adjust Remove 
A
dv
an
ce
d  
Advanced social engineering 
attack identified under 10 
seconds 
4 9 - - 
Advanced social engineering 
attack identified between 10 
seconds and 20 seconds 
2 9 - - 
Advanced social engineering 
attack identified longer than 20 
seconds 
0 8 1 - 
Si
m
pl
e 
Simple social engineering attack 
identified under 10 seconds 2 9 - - 
Simple social engineering attack 
identified between 10 seconds 
and 20 seconds 
1 9 - - 
Simple social engineering attack 
identified longer than 20 seconds 0 9 - - 
 
Part Two of the questionnaire asked the SMEs to review and validate the proposed 
components for the measures and scores of Cyber Curiosity relevant aspects of the IS 
participant performance during the Web-based experiment. The SMEs were asked to 
review and validate the proposed cyber curiosity measurements for each type of scenario. 
Their options were to 1-Keep, 2-Adjust, or 3-Remove. For Section C, there was 100% 
consensus from the SMEs to “Keep” the recommended scores for Cyber SA. Table 15 
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shows the Cyber Curiosity SMEs responses. Phase One of the research study was 
completed successfully addressing research RQ1a, RQ1b, RQ2a, and RQ2b. 
Table 15 
Cyber Curiosity Measurement Points 
  Curiosity Type SMEs Responses (N=9) 
Experiment User Action 
Selection Points I-Type D-Type Keep Adjust Remove 
Simple explanation (User 
will be presented with link 
to expand on explaining the 
section of the experiment 
such as “Learn more about 
Phishing Email Situational 
Awareness” 
  
-1  x 9 - - 
In-depth explanation (User 
will be presented with a 
link in the simple 
explanation section to seek 
further information such as 
“To learn further 
information about Phishing 
Email Situational 
Awareness”  
-2  x 9 - - 
Enticing Web link (User 
will be presented with a 
link to a non-SA awareness 
page with an entertaining 
story or topic.) 
 
1 x  9 - - 
Enticing Pop-up Web link 
(User will be presented 
with a pop-up to a non-SA 
awareness page with an 
entertaining story or topic.) 
2 x  9 - - 
 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research and Expert Panel (Phase Two) 
The development and SMEs validation of the proposed measure components and 
scores for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity from Phase One was used to operationalize the 
Web-based application and determine the Risk Taxonomy matrix scoring ranges (min 
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and max) for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. For Phase Two, the SMEs were solicited 
from LinkedIn professional contacts working in the maritime and cybersecurity industry. 
The SMEs data collection was started in early September 2019 and was completed by the 
end of September 2019.  
Phase Two – Data Collection 
The beginning of Phase Two data collection consisted of using a questionnaire 
filled out by cybersecurity SMEs to validate the proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy. The 
goal for this phase of the study was to complete an expert panel solicitation to review and 
validate the proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy using a consensus-building process 
implementing the Delphi technique. Upon data collection, the SMEs reviewed and 
validated the proposed classification for the Cyber Risk Taxonomy. 
A group of five SMEs participated in the review and validation using Google 
Formsâ questionnaire to gather the data. The SMEs background were mixture of 
cybersecurity and cyber maritime experts with at least ten years of professional 
experience. The questionnaire consisted two sections. The first section gathered the 
SMEs’ demographics. The second section gathered the validation responses for the Risk 
Taxonomy components.  
Phase Two – Data Pre-Analysis and Screening 
Prior to beginning data analysis, pre-analysis data screening was conducted on the 
data collected from the SMEs. SMEs responses were collected using Google Formsâ. To 
ensure data integrity, editing of data was prevented after submission from the 
participants. To ensure data completeness, each question in the SME review was required 
to be filled in prior to submission. Pre-analysis data screening was done by saving the 
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collected data to Google’s spreadsheet. In Google’s spreadsheet, the collected data has 
the submitted timestamp and responses entries for secure storage and retrieval. On 
performing pre-analysis data screening no responses were excluded, thus obtaining the 
full set of responses from the Delphi Review.  
Phase Two – Expert Panel Characteristics 
 Upon completing pre-analysis data screening, demographic analysis was 
performed on the collected SMEs Questionnaire (See Appendix F). Demographic 
information collected from the SMEs included gender, age, level of education, number of 
professional certifications, and years of professional experience. To qualify the expertise 
level of the SMEs, number of professional certifications, level of education, and years of 
professional experience were gathered to potentially remove SMEs responses who did 
not meet minimum requirements. For the SMEs that participated in Phase Two, all the 
them had at least a Bachelor’s or Technical Degree, majority held one or more 
professional certifications, and more than 12 years of professional experience (See Table 
16). 
Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics of the Phase Two SMEs Round (n=5) 
Demographic Item Frequency Percent 
Gender   
 Female 1 20% 
 Male 4 80% 
    
Age Category   
 35-44 2 40% 
 45-54 3 60% 
 
 
Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics of the Phase Two SMEs Round (n=5) (Cont.) 
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Demographic Item Frequency Percent 
Education   
 Bachelor’s Degree or Technical Degree 3 60% 
 Master’s Degree 2 40% 
Certifications   
 1 1 20% 
 2 1 20% 
 3 2 40% 
 4 1 20% 
Years of Professional Experience   
 12-15 2 55.6% 
 >=16 3 44.4% 
    
 
Phase Two – Data Analysis 
The purpose of the SMEs two-part questionnaire was to validate the proposed 
Cyber Risk Taxonomy to help develop and empirically validate the taxonomy in the 
context of cyber risk that can be used as a benchmark to measure the susceptibility of 
mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering techniques among IS users. The SMEs 
were asked to review and validate the proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy quadrants. Their 
options were to 1-Keep, 2-Adjust, or 3-Remove. All five SMEs had a consensus to 
“Keep” the quadrant labels and placement in the Cyber Risk Taxonomy for Low, 
Medium, High, and Very High quadrants (See Table 17). Phase Two of the research 
study was completed successfully addressing research RQ3. 
Table 17 
 
SMEs validation of Proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy (n=5) 
Item Review and Validation Item Keep Adjust Remove 
Low Risk Quadrant 
Components 
Quadrant label 5 - - 
Quadrant placement on Risk 
Taxonomy 5 - - 
 
Table 17 
  
83 
 
SMEs validation of Proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy (n=5) (Cont.) 
Item Review and Validation Item Keep Adjust Remove 
Medium Risk 
Quadrant 
Components 
Quadrant label 5 - - 
Quadrant placement on Risk 
Taxonomy 5 -  
High Risk 
Quadrant 
Components 
Quadrant label 5 - - 
Quadrant placement on Risk 
Taxonomy 5 - - 
Very High 
Risk 
Quadrant 
Components 
Quadrant label 5 - - 
Quadrant placement on Risk 
Taxonomy 5 - - 
 
Quantitative Research (Phase Three) 
The beginning of Phase Three consisted of pilot testing of 10 maritime IS users 
onboard a ship. Pilot testing was conducted to ensure that the Web-based experiment had 
adequate response times in loading the various Webpages, and that the experiment scores 
for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity were being recorded and submitted accurately to 
Amazon’s data storage location. Due to the limited ship satellite Internet bandwidth, 
adjustments needed to be made to the Web-based experiment application to improve the 
response and loading times of various Webpages. Minor adjustments such as limiting 
audio prompts and instructions to text, significantly improved the loading times so that 
the experiment can be completed within the expected time frame. After completing the 
pilot testing and making necessary but minor adjustments to the experiment, main data 
collection started with the maritime participants. Pilot and main data collection was 
started on October 20, 2019 and was completed on October 26, 2019. 
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Phase Three – Data Collection 
 In Phase Three, participants onboard the ship, the experiment site, were recruited 
by email and through verbal communication in crew areas to voluntary attend the 
cybersecurity awareness campaign where they would participant in the maritime research 
study experiment. The ship has 1,180 crew member capacity. Out of the potential 1,180 
crew members, about 261 (22.1%) are IS users. Out of the 261 potential shipboard IS 
users, 120 participants where collected, generating a 45.9% participation rate. To 
compare Cyber Curiosity and Cyber SA measures of shipboard with shoreside IS users, a 
small group of 54 participants were recruited through verbal and instant message 
communication. The shoreside participants were a convenience selected sample. In 
summary the total sample size for data analysis was 174 records. 
 Prior to starting the Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Web-based experiment, 
participants were asked demographic and “state-of-mind” questions. These survey 
responses were saved at Google Formsâ Web-based tool prior to starting the Web-based 
experiment. To ensure survey data completeness, all of the demographics section survey 
questions had enabled restrictions to require each question to be filled out prior to form 
submission. Accuracy of the experiment data captured was ensured by performing 
repeated testing of the Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Web-based experiment prior to 
conducing the experiment to evaluate the measured scores for both constructs Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity. Lastly, collected survey forms and experiment results were 
downloaded from Google Formsâ and Amazon’s DynamoDBâ into a MySQL database 
for pre-processing to prepare the data. Below were the steps taken to merge the survey 
form data and the experiment data.  
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• Step 1 – Merge survey form data with experiment data using unique identified of 
ParticipantID 
• Step 2 – Merged data that had orphaned records meaning non-matching 
ParticipantID’s were discarded 
Pre-analysis experiment data screening identified 23 out of the total 197 participants 
that started the experiment did not complete successfully the two parts of the experiment. 
These were identified by filtering where the pre-experiment survey and the captured 
experiment data has missing participant ID’s which was the method of matching the two 
data sets. The reason for the two data sets not having matching participant ID’s was either 
the survey was started and submitted but the experiment was not completed, or the pre-
experiment survey data was not successfully submitted to Google Forms during the start 
of the experiment.  
Once data pre-analysis was completed and a working data set was obtained, data 
coding of the pre-experiment questionnaire responses was performed. A data coding 
legend was created for demographic information such as age, gender, nationality, 
department, years performing job function, and education level to help with data analysis. 
After this initial pre-processing, the data was then exported from MySQL in comma 
separated format (CSV) and imported into IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) for further pre-analysis data screening.  
 
Phase Three – Data Pre-Analysis and Screening 
 To ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data collected for this research study, 
frequency distribution and descriptive statistics were used using IBM’s SPSS tool. 
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Frequency distribution analysis was performed on the measures collected during the 
experiment to assess if the range of values for Cyber Curiosity and Cyber SA were within 
anticipated ranges. See Figure 10 and 11 for the frequency distribution of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity. The Cyber SA mean score was 1.01 (N=174, St.Dev = 1.958) with a 
range from -2 to 9. The Cyber Curiosity mean score was 0.2 (N=174, St.Dev = 1.226) 
with a range from -3 to 3. While one case was detected as potential multivariate outlier, 
upon closer investigation, it was decided to keep the record in and assess with and 
without it to verify. Initial assessments did not result in any differences, thus the case was 
retained for all further analyses. After the pre-analysis phase, a total of 174 or 88.3% of 
the survey and experiment results used for phase three data analysis. 
 
 
Figure 10. Frequency Distribution of Cyber SA scores (total) for both maritime IS and 
shoreside users (N=174). 
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Figure 11. Frequency Distribution of Cyber Curiosity scores for both maritime IS and 
shoreside users (N=174). 
 
Phase Three - Data Analysis 
 Phase Three consisted of a quantitative data analysis of the collected Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity data from 120 maritime IS and 54 shoreside IS users. The collected 
data was analyzed to address RQ4, RQ5a, RQ5b, and RQ5c.  
Demographic Analysis 
 After finishing the pre-analysis and data screening phase, 174 or 88.3% results 
remained for analysis. The data collected represents a likeness to that of the general 
sample targeted which was maritime IS and shoreside IS users working for a passenger 
vessel company. An analysis of the participants gender identity revealed the majority 
were male (113 or 64.9%) and then followed by female (58 or 33.3%). A very minor 
group were identified as transgender female, transgender male or did not prefer to answer 
and were grouped as “Other.” Analysis of the participants’ age ranges revealed that the 
  
88 
majority were within three age groups, 25-34 or 28.7%, 35-44 or 33.9%, and 45.54 or 
28.7%. An analysis of participants’ nationality or geographic region of identification had 
a wide range of representation with the majority identified as from Europe (47 or 27%), 
Asia (46 or 26.4%), South-Central America (25 or 14.4%), North America (23 or 13.2%) 
and Caribbean (22 or 12.6%). The participants’ working area revealed a wide range of 
representation of over 15 departments with the top two of the users from Hotel (33 or 
19%) as well as Food and Beverage (26 or 14.9%). Details of the demographics of the 
total population are presented in Table 18. 
Table 18 
Descriptive Statistics of the Participants (N=174) 
Demographic Item Frequency Percent 
Gender   
 Female 58 33.3% 
 Male 113 64.9% 
 Other 3 1.8% 
    
Age Category   
 18-24 5 2.9% 
 25-34 50 28.7% 
 35-44 59 33.9% 
 45-54 50 28.7% 
 55-64 10 5.7% 
    
Nationality   
 Africa 6 3.4% 
 Asia 46 26.4% 
 Caribbean 22 12.6% 
 Europe 47 27.0% 
 Middle East 3 1.7% 
 North America 23 13.2% 
 Oceania 2 1.1% 
 South-Central America 25 14.4% 
    
Department   
 Cruise Division 6 3.4% 
 Deck 10 5.7% 
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Table 18 
Descriptive Statistics of the Participants (N=174) (Cont.) 
 
Demographic Item Frequency Percent 
Department 
 Engine 13 7.5% 
 Financial 7 4.0% 
 Food & Beverage 26 14.9% 
 Guest Services 14 8.0% 
 Hotel Department 33 19.0% 
 Housekeeping 14 8.0% 
 Human Resources 4 2.3% 
 Inventory 7 4.0% 
 IT 20 11.5% 
 Marketing & Revenue 11 6.3% 
 Medical 6 3.4% 
 Other 2 1.1% 
 Security 1 0.6% 
    
Years Performing Job   
 <=2 5 2.9% 
 3-5 40 23.0% 
 6-8 31 17.8% 
 9-11 24 13.8% 
 12-15 36 20.7% 
 >=16 38 21.8% 
    
Education   
 Primary or some High School 3 1.7% 
 Secondary or High School 14 8.0% 
 Some College or Technical 
School 
44 25.3% 
 Bachelor’s Degree or Technical 
Degree 
81 46.6% 
 Master’s Degree 32 18.4% 
 
A data analysis of frequencies, percentages, and one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to assess for any differences between the two experimental 
groups, maritime and shoreside. The two-group identification were labeled as Group A 
for the maritime IS users (n1=120), and Group B for the shoreside IS users (n2=54). 
Group A, the maritime IS users, consisted of 120 or 69% of the total sample. Group B, 
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the shoreside IS users, consisted of 54 or 31% of the total sample. In comparing the two 
groups, Group A and Group B, there were no significant differences in gender 
percentages between the groups. Details of the demographics of the total population for 
the two groups are presented in Table 19. 
Table 19 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Participants by Group (N=174) 
Demographic Item 
Group A 
(n1=120) 
Maritime 
Group B 
(n2=54) 
Shoreside 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Gender     
 Female 37 30.8% 21 38.9% 
 Male 80 66.7% 33 61.1% 
 Other 3 2.5% 0 0% 
      
Age Category     
 18-24 5 4.2% 0  0% 
 25-34 41 34.2% 9 16.7% 
 35-44 43 35.8% 16 29.6% 
 45-54  28 23.3% 22 40.7% 
 55-64 3 2.5% 7 13.0% 
Nationality     
 Africa 6 5.0% 0   
 Asia 40 33.3% 6 11.1% 
 Caribbean 9 7.5% 13 24.1% 
 Europe 36 30.0% 11 20.4% 
 Middle East 2 1.7% 1 1.9% 
 North America 8 6.7% 15 27.8% 
 Oceania 2 1.7% 0   
 South-Central America 17 14.2% 8 14.8% 
Department     
 Cruise Division 6 5.0% 0 0% 
 Deck 9 7.5% 1 1.9% 
 Engine 10 8.3% 3 5.6% 
 Financial 3 2.5% 4 7.4% 
 Food & Beverage 24 20.0% 2 3.7% 
 Guest Services 7 5.8% 7 13.0% 
 Hotel Department 33 27.5% 0 0% 
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Table 19 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Participants by Group (N=174) (Cont.) 
Demographic Item 
Group A 
(n1=120) 
Maritime 
Group B 
(n2=54) 
Shoreside 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
 Housekeeping 14 11.7% 0 0% 
 Human Resources 1 0.8% 3 5.6% 
 Inventory 2 1.7% 5 9.3% 
 IT 0 0% 20 37.0% 
 Marketing & Revenue 9 7.5% 2 3.7% 
 Medical 1 0.8% 5 9.3% 
 Other 1 0.8% 1 1.9% 
 Security 0 0% 1 1.9% 
Years Performing Job     
 <=2 5 4.2% 0 0% 
 3-5 30 25.0% 10 18.5% 
 6-8 18 15.0% 13 24.1% 
 9-11 14 11.7% 10 18.5% 
 12-15 22 18.3% 14 25.9% 
 >=16 31 25.8% 7 13.0% 
Education     
 Primary or some High 
School 
3 2.5% 0 0% 
 Secondary or High 
School 
14 11.7% 0 0% 
 Some College or 
Technical School 
40 33.3% 4 7.4% 
 Bachelor’s Degree or 
Technical Degree 
46 38.3% 35 64.8% 
 Master’s Degree 17 14.2% 15 27.8% 
 
To analyze if there exist mean group differences between maritime and shoreside 
groups an independent t-test was employed. The results from the procedures are 
presented in Table 20 through Table 21. The results indicate that there was a significant 
difference in Years Performing Job, Education, and Psychological State of Mind (P1 and 
P2) between the two groups. In reviewing the Years Performing Job for maritime (M = 
3.93; St.Dev = 1.661) and shoreside (M = 3.91; St.Dev = 1.336) their categorical mean 
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averages differences were negligible. When analyzing the frequency statistics between 
maritime and shoreside, the maritime participants had double percentage difference in 
equal or greater than 16 years of job experience; 13% for shoreside participants while 
maritime had 26%. Analysis of level of Education level revealed that 47% of the 
maritime participants had less than a Bachelor’s degree while the majority of shoreside 
participants had a Bachelors or higher degree (See Table 19). In analyzing P1-Uplift and 
P2-Interest Phycological State of Mind responses, maritime participants were more open 
to sharing this information (13% Preferred not to answer) while the shoreside participants 
were less willing (64.8% Preferred not to answer). 
 
Table 20 
 
Group Statistics for Demographics 
Item Group N Mean St.Dev 
Age Maritime 120 - - 
Shoreside 54 - - 
Gender Maritime 120 - - 
Shoreside 54 - - 
Nationality Maritime 120 - - 
Shoreside 54 - - 
Department Maritime 120 - - 
Shoreside 54 - - 
Years Performing Job Maritime 120 3.93 1.661 
Shoreside 54 3.91 1.336 
Education Maritime 120 3.50 .961 
Shoreside 54 4.20 .562 
P1 - Uplift Maritime 120 3.60 .991 
Shoreside 54 4.57 .633 
P2 - Interest Maritime 120 3.62 1.022 
Shoreside 54 4.61 .564 
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Table 21 
Independent Samples Test of Demographics 
 
Item 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.  
(2-
talied) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lowe
r Upper 
Age 0.440 0.508 -4.278 172 
0.000**
* -0.642 
-
0.938 -0.346 
Gender 0.041 0.839 1.397 172 0.164 0.139 -0.057 
0.335 
Nationalit
y 
0.117 0.732 0.225 172 0.822 0.073 -0.569 
0.715 
Departme
nt 
0.024 0.876 -3.342 172 
0.001**
* -1.835 
-
2.919 
-0.751 
Years 
Performin
g Job 
8.426 0.004** 0.068 172 0.945 0.018 
-
0.490 0.525 
Education 22.70
4 
0.000
*** 
-
6.043 
160.47
5 
0.000**
* -0.704 
-
0.934 -0.474 
P1 - 
Uplift 8.796 
0.003
** 
-
7.802 
152.07
2 
0.000**
* -0.974 
-
1.221 -0.727 
P2 - 
Interest 
12.96
0 
0.000
*** 
-
8.233 
165.01
9 
0.000**
* -0.994 
-
1.233 -0.756 
 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001 
 
Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Positioning on Cyber Risk Taxonomy 
 To answer research Q4, “How are the aggregated scores for Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity positioned on the Cyber Risk taxonomy for maritime IS users”, the taxonomy 
chart is shown on Figure 13. Within the IS User Cyber SA (CSA) and Cyber Curiosity 
(CC) Risk Taxonomy charts, the x-axis represents the level of IS user Cyber Curiosity (I-
Type and D-Type) and the y-axis represents the level of IS users Cyber SA. The 
coordinates (x,y) represents the combined experiment scores for both CC and CSA. The 
  
94 
size of the bubble in each chart represents the count of how many participants had the 
same CSA and CC total score from the web-based experiment. 
The developed and SMEs validated taxonomy is comprised of four quadrants Q1, 
Q2, Q3, and Q4 as depicted in Figure 12. Each quadrant reflects the aggregate level of IS 
user cyber risk and their susceptibility to a social engineering attack. In the risk matrix, 
there is direct relationship between the level of I-Type Cyber Curiosity and an inverse 
relationship with the level of Cyber SA and the resultant cyber risk to an organization. 
The first quadrant, Q1, is labeled ‘Medium Cyber Risk’ because it consists of IS users 
with high D-Type Cyber Curiosity, low I-type Cyber Curiosity, and low Cyber SA score. 
IS users positioned in this quadrant are capable of reducing their likelihood of being 
susceptible to a successful social engineering attack by increasing their Cyber SA. The 
second quadrant, Q2, is labeled ‘Very High Cyber Risk’ because it consists of IS users 
with high I-Type Cyber Curiosity, low D-Type Cyber Curiosity, and low Cyber SA. 
Cyber risk in this quadrant is very high because IS users are more susceptible to a 
successful social engineering attack because of their high level of I-Type Cyber Curiosity 
and low Cyber SA of a possible cyber-attack. The third quadrant, Q3, is labeled ‘High 
Cyber Risk’ because it consists of IS users with high I-Type Cyber Curiosity, low D-type 
Cyber Curiosity and high Cyber SA. IS users positioned in this quadrant maybe capable 
of reducing their likelihood of being susceptible to a successful social engineering attack 
by decreasing their I-Type Cyber Curiosity and increasing D-Type Cyber Curiosity. 
According to Litman, Hutkins, and Russon (2005), smaller knowledge gaps will “arouse 
more curiosity and stimulate more exploratory behavior” (p. 561). The fourth quadrant, 
Q4, consists IS users with high D-Type Cyber Curiosity and high Cyber SA and is 
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labeled ‘Low Cyber Risk’. IS users in this quadrant are keen of social engineering tools, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) meaning that they will be the least susceptible to a 
successful future attack. 
 
Figure 12. IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy 
The results of how the aggregated scores for CSA and CC are positioned on the 
Cyber Risk taxonomy for both maritime and shoreside IS users (N=174) are shown in 
Figure 13. In analyzing the participants aggregated scores obtained for both Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity measurements, the largest groups are located in the lower right 
quadrant indicating that the majority of the users have a very high level of cyber risk. In 
reviewing the participants CC scores, the majority of IS users had an inclination towards 
I-Type curiosity. I-Type curiosity involves the pleasure of new discoveries versus D-
Type that is concerned with reducing uncertainty or unwanted states of ignorance 
(Litman, 2008). In a Cyber SA context, IS users with higher I-Type curiosity scores also 
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had lower Cyber SA scores thus possibly susceptible to a successful social engineering 
attack. 
In analyzing the maritime participants (n=120) aggregated scores obtained for 
both Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity measurements, the largest groups are located in the 
lower right quadrant indicating that the majority of the users have a very high level of 
cyber risk (See Figure 14). In reviewing the maritime participants CC scores, the IS users 
had an inclination towards I-Type curiosity. In analyzing the shoreside participants 
(n=54) aggregated scores obtained for both Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 
measurements, the largest groups are located in the lower left quadrant indicating that the 
majority of the users have a medium level of cyber risk (See Figure 15). In reviewing the 
shoreside participants CC scores, the IS users had an inclination towards D-Type 
curiosity. D-Type curiosity is concerned with reducing uncertainty or unwanted states of 
ignorance (Litman, 2008). 
 
 
  
97 
Figure 13. IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, Bubble size 
represents the participant count (N=174) 
 
 
Figure 14. Maritime IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, Bubble size 
represents the participant count (n=120) 
 
 
Figure 15. Shoreside IS User Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, Bubble 
size represents the participant count (n=54) 
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Cyber SA Data Analysis 
To answer RQ5a, which is “Are there any significant differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber SA based on their age, gender, nationality, job function, 
years at performing job, education level, or psychological state of mind?”, a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed. The alpha level was set as ⍺=0.05, as the 
conventional standard of statistical significance (p ≤ .05). In reviewing the age, gender, 
nationality, department, years performing job, education level, and psychological state of 
mind, for the maritime and shoreside IS users (N=174), the statistical tests show that an 
IS users’ Department F(14, 159) = 2.128, p = 0.013 has the most significant difference in 
Cyber SA scores among the other groups. An ANOVA analysis of the other categories 
Age F(4, 169) = 0.529 , p = 0.715, Gender F(4, 169) = 1.479, p = 0.211, Nationality F(7, 
166) = 0.918, p = 0.494, Years Performing Job F(5, 168) = 0.610, p = 0.693, Education 
Level F(4, 169) = 0.603, p = 0.661, Psychological state of mind P1-Uplift (F(4, 169) 
1.770, p = 0.137) and P2-Interest (F(5, 168) 1.619, p = 0.158) were not significant. Table 
22 provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, and ANOVA results.  
Table 22 
ANOVA Results for Cyber SA (N=174) 
Item Min Max Mean St.Dev F Sig. 
Age 1 5 3.06 0.960 0.529 0.715 
Gender - - - - 1.479 0.211 
Nationality  - - - - 0.918 0.494 
Department - - - - 2.128 0.013* 
Years Performing Job  1 6 3.92 1.563 .610 0.693 
Education Level 1 5 3.72 0.916 .603 0.661 
P1 – Uplift 1 5 3.90 1.001 1.770 0.137 
P2 – Interest 1 5 3.93 1.014 1.619 0.158 
Note. Variables with missing min, max, min or St.Dev are nominal 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001 
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Cyber SA Data Analysis by Group 
In analyzing the mean score by Department, the Inventory Group A ((n1=120), M 
= 3.0) had five-fold difference in the magnitude of Cyber SA mean score than Group B 
((n2=54), M = 0.60) (See Figure 16). Further analysis using a one-way ANOVA did not 
have any significant differences of Department analyzing the two groups individually, 
Group A maritime F(12, 107) 1.377, p = 0.188 and Group B shoreside F(11, 42) = 0.796, 
p = 0.643 (See Table 21). An analysis of age, gender, nationality, department, years 
performing job, education level, and psychological state of mind (P1 – Uplift & P2 – 
Interest) for maritime (Group A, n1=120) and shoreside (Group B, n2 = 54), did not have 
statistically significant differences with Cyber SA among the other groups. After the 
ANOVA analysis, a paired sample t-test was conducted to determine if there was a 
significant difference in Cyber SA scores between Group A and Group B. There was not 
a significant difference between the maritime (M = 0.67; St.Dev = 1.626) and shoreside 
(M = 1.76; St.Dev = 2.394) IS users. RQ5a was successfully addressed through the 
performed analysis. Table 23 provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, and 
ANOVA results by Group for Cyber SA scores. 
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Figure 16. Means of the Cyber SA scores by Department (N=174) 
 
Table 23 
ANOVA Results of Participants by Group for Cyber SA 
Item 
Group A 
Maritime 
(n1=120) 
Group B 
Shoreside 
(n2=54) 
Mean St.Dev F Sig. Mean St.Dev F Sig. 
Age 2.86 0.910 2.028 0.095 3.50 0.927 0.184 0.907 
Gender - - 2.291 0.064 - - 1.089 0.301 
Nationality - - 1.055 0.398 - - .520 0.760 
Department - - 1.377 0.188 - - .796 0.643 
Years 
Performing Job 3.93 1.661 0.899 0.484 3.91 1.336 1.332 0.271 
Education 
Level 3.50 0.961 0.442 0.778 4.20 0.562 .287 0.752 
P1 - Uplift 3.60 0.991 1.406 0.236 4.57 0.633 .726 0.489 
P2 - Interest 3.62 1.022 0.898 0.485 4.61 0.564 2.183 0.123 
Note. Variables with missing min, max, min or St.Dev are nominal 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001  
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To analyze if there exist mean group differences in Cyber SA scores between 
maritime and shoreside IS users, an independent t-test was employed. The results from 
the procedures are presented in Table 24 through Table 25. The results indicate that 
shoreside IS users have more than double the Cyber SA mean scores than maritime IS 
users. There is also a significant statistical difference in the mean Cyber SA scores 
between maritime and shoreside IS users indicating that shoreside IS users had a better 
ability to identify a social engineering attack. 
Table 24 
 
Group Statistics for Cyber SA 
Group N Mean St.Dev 
Maritime 120 0.67 1.626 
Shoreside 54 1.76 2.394 
 
Table 25 
 
Independent Samples Test of Cyber SA 
 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.  
(2-talied) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
5.318 0.022* -3.051 75.828 0.003** -1.093 -1.806 -0.379 
 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001  
 
Cyber Curiosity Data Analysis 
To answer RQ5b, which is “Are there any significant differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber Curiosity based on their age, gender, nationality, job 
function, years at performing job, education level, or psychological state of mind?”, a 
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one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. In reviewing the age, gender, 
nationality, department, years performing job, education level, and psychological state of 
mind, for the maritime and shoreside IS users (N=174), the statistical tests show that an 
IS users’ Department F(14, 159) = 1.980, p = 0.022 has the most significant difference in 
Cyber Curiosity scores among the other groups (See Table 24). In analyzing the mean 
score by Department, Group B had a double the magnitude mean score of D-Type Cyber 
Curiosity for the Deck (M = -2.0) and Other (M = -3.0) department (See Figure 17). The 
“Other” department had a high D-type curiosity score, but this only represented one 
shoreside participant. Further analysis using a one-way ANOVA did not have any 
significant differences of Department analyzing the two groups individually, Group A 
maritime F(12, 107) 0.612, p = 0.828 and Group B shoreside F(11, 42) = 1.524 , p = 
0.159 (See Table 27). Table 26 provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, 
and ANOVA results. 
Table 26 
ANOVA Results for Cyber Curiosity(N=174)  
 IV Mean St.Dev F Sig. 
Age 3.06 0.960 1.372 0.246 
Gender - - 2.069 0.087 
Nationality - - 1.542 0.156 
Department - - 1.980 0.022* 
Years Performing Job 3.92 1.563 0.225 0.951 
Education Level 3.72 0.916 2.096 0.084 
P1 – Uplift 3.90 1.001 1.506 0.203 
P2 – Interest 3.92 1.014 2.066 0.072 
Note. Variables with missing min, max, min or St.Dev are nominal 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001 
 
  
103 
 
Figure 17. Means of the Cyber Curiosity scores by Department (N=174) 
 
Cyber Curiosity Data Analysis by Group 
In reviewing the age, gender, nationality, department, years performing job, 
education level, and psychological state of mind, for both the maritime (Group A, 
n1=120) and shoreside (Group B, n2=54), the statistical tests show within Group A 
Gender F(4,159) = 2.128, p = 0.016 has a significant difference in Cyber Curiosity 
among the other groups. This variance was further analyzed and was caused by an outlier 
score by a single transgender male with a score CC score of -3. After performing an 
ANOVA and filtering for Gender within Group A not equal to transgender male, the 
Gender variance was F(3,115) .249, p = 0.862. After the ANOVA analysis, a paired 
sample t-test was conducted to determine if there was a significant difference in Cyber 
SA scores between Group A and Group B. There was not a significant difference 
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between the maritime (M = 0.67; St.Dev = 1.626) and shoreside (M = 1.76; St.Dev = 
2.394) IS users. RQ5b was successfully addressed through the performed analysis. Table 
27 provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, and ANOVA results for each 
group. 
Table 27 
 
ANOVA Results of Participants by Group for Cyber Curiosity 
Item 
Group A 
Maritime 
(n1=120) 
Group B 
Shoreside 
(n2=54) 
Mean St.Dev F Sig. Mean 
St.De
v F Sig. 
Age 2.86 0.910 1.249 0.294 3.50 0.927 1.411 0.251 
Gender - - 3.203 0.016* - - 1.332 0.254 
Nationality - - 0.602 0.753 - - 4.068 .004** 
Department - - 0.612 0.828 - - 1.524 0.159 
Years 
Performing Job 3.93 1.661 1.133 0.347 3.91 1.336 1.262 0.298 
Education Level 3.50 0.961 .037 0.997 4.20 .562 .962 0.389 
P1 - Uplift 3.60 0.991 1.969 0.104 4.57 .633 2.968 0.060 
P2 - Interest 3.62 1.022 1.404 0.228 4.61 .564 4.783 0.012* 
Note. Variables with missing min, max, min or St.Dev are nominal 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001  
 
To analyze if there exist mean group differences in Cyber Curiosity scores 
between maritime and shoreside IS users, an independent t-test was employed. The 
results from the procedures are presented in Table 28 through Table 29. The results 
indicate that maritime IS users are more inclined to have I-Type curiosity while shoreside 
IS users are inclined to have D-Type curiosity.  
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Table 28 
 
Group Statistics for Cyber Curiosity 
Group N Mean St.Dev 
Maritime 120 0.58 1.074 
Shoreside 54 -0.65 1.119 
 
Table 29 
 
Independent Samples Test of Cyber Curiosity 
 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.  
(2-talied) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
1.705 0.193 6.909 172 0.000*** 1.231 0.880 1.583 
 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001  
 
Cyber Risk Data Analysis 
To answer RQ5c, which is “Are there any significant differences to an IS user’s 
Cyber Risk score based on their age, gender, nationality, department, years performing 
job, education level, or psychological state of mind?”, a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was employed. This study assumes the Cyber Risk score as the representation 
of the participants Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity scores combined as indicated by the 
Cyber Risk score calculations previously stated in the research methodology data 
aggregation section. An analysis of age, gender, nationality, department, years 
performing job, education level, and psychological state of mind (P1 – Uplift & P2 – 
Interest) for the total sample (N=174) did not show a significant difference with the 
product score of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity in comparison with the other independent 
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variables. Table 30 provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, and ANOVA 
results. 
Table 30 
 
ANOVA Results for Cyber Risk Score (N=174)  
 IV Mean St.Dev F Sig. 
Age 3.06 0.960 1.114 0.352 
Gender - - 1.811 0.129 
Nationality - - 0.317 0.945 
Department - - 1.158 0.313 
Years Performing Job 3.92 1.563 1.050 0.390 
Education Level 3.72 0.916 .975 0.422 
P1 - Uplift 3.90 1.001 .285 .888 
P2 - Interest 3.92 1.014 .088 .994 
Note. Variables with missing min, max, min or St.Dev are nominal 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001 
 
In reviewing the age, gender, nationality, department, years performing job, 
education level, and psychological state of mind for the maritime IS users (Group A, 
n1=120), this study determined that Gender and Department had the most statistically 
significant difference in comparison with the other independent variables. There was a 
close significant difference between Gender groups as calculated by an ANOVA F(4,115) 
= 2.430, p = 0.052. There was also a close significant difference between Department 
groups as calculated by an ANOVA F(12,107) = 1.793, p = .058. An ANOVA analysis of 
the other categories Age F(4,115) =0.924 , p = 0.452, Nationality F(7,112) = 0.859, p = 
0.542, Years Performing Job F(5,114) = 0.633, p = 0.675, Education Level F(4,115) = 
0.574, p = 0.682, Psychological state of mind P1-Uplift (F(4,115) = 0.507, p = 0.731), 
P2-Interest (F(5,114) = 0.641, p = 0.699) were not significant. In reviewing the age, 
gender, nationality, department, years performing job, education level, and psychological 
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state of mind for the maritime IS users (Group B, n1=54), this study determined that 
Psychological state of mind P1-Uplift F((2,51) = 6.116, p = 0.004) and P2-Uplift (F(2,51) 
= 6.107, p = 0.004) had the most statistically significant difference in comparison with 
the other independent variables. Table 31 provides an overview of the mean, standard 
deviation, and ANOVA results. 
Table 31 
ANOVA Results of Participants by Group for Cyber Risk 
Item 
Group A 
Maritime 
(n1=120) 
Group B 
Shoreside 
(n2=54) 
Mean St.Dev F Sig. Mean St.Dev F Sig. 
Age 2.86 0.910 .924 0.452 3.50 0.927 0.418 0.741 
Gender - - 2.430 0.052 - - 0.147 0.703 
Nationality - - 0.859 0.542 - - 1.534 0.197 
Department - - 1.793 0.058 - - 1.146 0.352 
Years 
Performing Job 3.93 1.661 0.633 0.675 3.91 1.336 1.680 0.170 
Education 
Level 3.50 0.961 0.574 0.682 4.20 0.562 0.319 0.728 
P1 – Uplift 3.60 0.991 0.507 0.731 4.57 0.633 6.116 0.004** 
P2 – Interest 3.62 1.022 0.641 0.699 4.61 0.564 6.107 0.004** 
Note. Variables with missing min, max, min or St.Dev are nominal 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001  
 
To analyze if there exist mean group differences in Cyber Risk scores between 
maritime and shoreside IS users, an independent t-test was employed. The results from 
the procedures are presented in Table 32 through Table 33. The results indicate that 
maritime IS users do not have a significant statistical difference in Cyber Risk than 
shoreside IS users. 
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Table 32 
 
Group Statistics for Cyber Risk 
 
Group N Mean St.Dev 
Maritime 120 18.8333 9.68698 
Shoreside 54 16.5741 10.14536 
 
Table 33 
 
Independent Samples Test of Cyber Risk 
 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.  
(2-talied) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
0.146 0.703 1.403 172 0.163 2.25926 -0.92038 5.43890 
 
*-p<.05, **-p<.01, *** -p<.001  
 
Summary 
 This chapter contained the results and data analysis conducted in this research 
study. Phase One of this research SME reviewed the proposed measure components and 
scores of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. Phase One concluded with addressing research 
RQ1a, RQ1b, RQ2a, and RQ2b. Phase Two SMEs validated the proposed Risk 
Taxonomy using the Delphi technique. Phase Two concluded with addressing RQ3. 
Phase Three began with a pilot test of the experiment to assess the measures of Cyber 
SA and Cyber Curiosity. Needed adjustments were made to the experiment based on the 
feedback from the pilot experiment. After refinements were made to the experiment, 
Phase Three completed the analysis of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity data from 120 
maritime and 54 shoreside IS users. 
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The five goals of this study were accomplished using a three-phase research 
methodology approach. The first goal was to identify, classify, and validate, using SMEs, 
the components for the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The second goal was 
to identify the scores of the identified components of the measures of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity, using SMEs and the Delphi method to validate aggregation to the 
proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy. The third goal was to develop and validate, using SMEs, 
a Cyber Risk taxonomy to classify maritime IS users by their level of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity. The fourth goal was to use the validated Cyber Risk taxonomy in an 
experiment to classify maritime IS users. The position of the participants in the Cyber 
Risk taxonomy were presented in Figure 14 and Figure 15. The last and fifth goal was to 
empirically assess if there are any significant differences in the maritime IS user’s level 
of Cyber SA, Cyber Curiosity, and Cyber Risk when controlled for demographics 
indicators such as age, gender, nationality, department, years performing job, and 
education level. The results of the ANOVA were presented in Table 20 through Table 31 
which met the fifth goal of this research study.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
Phishing is one the most common forms of social engineering attack and used in 
43% of all breaches (Verizon, 2018). Because the success rate of IS users clicking on 
phishing emails steadily increases year to year (Verizon, 2016), phishing attacks 
continues to be a prevalent and easy form of cyber-attack (Gupta et al., 2016). This 
research attempts to better understand the human nature of these types of cyber risks with 
the development and SME validation of a Cyber Risk taxonomy. The Cyber Risk 
taxonomy assesses an IS user’s susceptibility of being a victim of a social engineering 
cyber-attack. This chapter contains the conclusions of this research study. Followed by a 
discussion of the findings in the larger context of social engineering and cybersecurity. 
Proceeding with sharing the implications of this conducted research to the IS body of 
knowledge. And concluding with recommendations for further research. This study 
attempted to address the limited Cyber SA of social engineering threats used against IS 
users and the natural curiosity that creates a significant threat to organizations (Iuga, 
Nurse, & Erola, 2016). This research objective was achieved successfully addressing the 
five research goals and research questions. This research study used a three-phased 
developmental methodology approach. The first phase SME reviewed and validated, 
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using the Delphi method, the proposed measure components and scores of Cyber SA and 
Cyber Curiosity. The second phase SME validated the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy to 
help develop and empirically validate an IS cyber situational awareness (SA) taxonomy 
in the context of Cyber Curiosity that can be used as a benchmark to measure the 
susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering techniques among IS 
users. The third phase consisted of field testing the developed web-experiment in a 
maritime environment with IS users to assess the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity. Lastly, the final phase concluded with the analysis and summary of the 
gathered experiment data. 
Discussion 
The results of this study indicated that there was not a significant difference in IS 
users’ Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity by Age, Years Performing Job, nor Education 
Level. There was a significant difference in Cyber SA when evaluating both maritime 
and shoreside in the participants Department but not when analyzing each group 
separately. When analyzing Cyber SA scores individually by groups, maritime and 
shoreside, there were no statistically significant differences observed on Age, Gender, 
Nationality, Department, Years Performing Job, Education Level, or Psychological State. 
Another observation was that shoreside IS users were more reluctant to share their 
psychological state of mind than were maritime users.  
When analyzing the participants’ positioning on the Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity Risk Taxonomy, the larger groups have a very high level of cyber risk. Another 
observation was that participants as a whole, had an inclination towards I-Type curiosity. 
IS users with higher I-Type Cyber Curiosity also had lower Cyber SA scores, thus 
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possibly less successful at detecting a social engineering attack. Even though the sample 
size of 174 IS users was valid for this research study, further research onboard other types 
and size of vessels can increase the validation of the results and its generalizability. In 
analyzing the maritime and the shoreside groups individually on their placement on the 
Cyber Risk taxonomy, the maritime IS users were classified as high risk high. This result 
can be attributed to their higher levels of I-Type Cyber Curiosity and low level of D-type 
Cyber Curiosity. The unique operating conditions of maritime IS users where they are 
working extended periods of time away at sea can possibly impede their interest in D-
Type curiosity and engage in more I-Type curiosity and impact their Cyber SA. 
Implications 
This study provides the maritime industry with valuable insights into the 
susceptibility of social engineering attacks because of the limited awareness of 
cybersecurity risks in the maritime sector. In leveraging experiment results from this 
study that determined participants are highly susceptible to socially engineering attacks 
due to their lower Cyber SA and higher levels of I-Type curiosity than D-Type curiosity, 
the maritime industry can develop cybersecurity awareness programs that increases 
Cyber SA by requiring IS users to reduce uncertainty in how to identify a social 
engineering cyber-attack. 
Recommendations and Future Research 
 More research is needed to take place in other maritime industries beyond a 
passenger vessel setting. These would include supply chain ports, cargo vessels, and 
offshore facilities. Another recommendation for future research includes investigating 
other psychological states of mind beyond those measured in the pre-experiment 
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questionnaire. Further investigating other psychological behaviors (i.e. boredom and 
depression) that impact the levels of Cyber Curiosity or Cyber SA can shed insights to 
reduce cybersecurity risks.  
Summary 
This research study addressed the research problem of limited Cyber SA of social 
engineering threat vector used against information system (IS) users, and the natural 
human curiosity that creates a significant cybersecurity threat to organizations (Iuga, 
Nurse, & Erola, 2016). The main goal of this research was to design, develop, and to 
empirically validate an IS Cyber SA in the context of Cyber Curiosity taxonomy that 
measures the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering 
techniques on IS users in the maritime industry 
This study had five specific goals. The first research goal was to identify, classify, 
and validate, using SMEs the components for the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber 
Curiosity. The second goal was to identify the scores of the identified components of the 
measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity, using SMEs that enable a validated 
aggregation to the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy. The third goal was to develop and 
validate, using SMEs, a Cyber Risk taxonomy to classify maritime IS users by their level 
of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity. The fourth research goal was to use the validated 
Cyber Risk taxonomy in an experiment to classify 174 maritime and shoreside IS users. 
The fifth research goal was to empirically assess if there are any significant differences in 
the 174 maritime and shoreside IS user’s level of Cyber SA, Cyber Curiosity, and 
position in the Cyber Risk taxonomy when controlled for demographics indicators such 
as: age, gender, department, years performing job function, and education level. 
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In Phase One, a panel of SMEs were solicited from the maritime industry and 
cybersecurity to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1a: What are the SMEs identified components of the measures of an IS user’s 
level of Cyber SA which may influence the susceptibility of being a victim 
of a social engineering cyber-attack? 
RQ1b: What are the SMEs identified components of the measures of an IS user’s 
level of Cyber Curiosity which may influence the susceptibility of being a 
victim of a social engineering cyber-attack? 
RQ2a: What are the specific scores of the SMEs identified components of the IS 
user’s measures of Cyber SA that enable a validated hierarchical 
aggregation to the Cyber SA measure of the Cyber Risk taxonomy? 
RQ2b: What are the specific scores of the SMEs identified components of the IS 
user’s measures of Cyber Curiosity that enable a validated hierarchical 
aggregation to the Cyber Curiosity measure of the Cyber Risk taxonomy? 
The SMEs background included a mixture of cybersecurity and cyber maritime experts 
with at least ten years of professional experience. The Delphi method was used to obtain 
consensus among SME’s validate the proposed Cyber Risk taxonomy components for the 
measures of Cyber SA levels, Cyber Curiosity levels, and the scores of the identified 
components of the measures of Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity.  
In Phase Two another panel of SMEs were solicited from the maritime industry 
and cybersecurity to answer the following research question: 
RQ3: What are the experts’ approved classification of the Social Engineering 
Attack Experiment using the hierarchical aggregation of Cyber SA and 
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Cyber Curiosity for the cyber-Risk Taxonomy using a social engineering 
attack experiment? 
The Delphi method was used to obtain consensus among SME’s validate the proposed 
classification for the Cyber Risk Taxonomy. 
In Phase Three, pilot test of the Web-based experiment was conducted using a 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative data collection, to assess measures of Cyber SA 
and Cyber Curiosity. After minor refinements were made to the experiment based on 
feedback of the pilot experiment, Phase Three successfully conducted a quantitative 
empirical study by collecting Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity data from 120 maritime IS 
and 54 shoreside IS users. Lastly, the collected data was analyzed to address the 
following questions: 
RQ4: How are the aggregated scores for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity 
positioned on the Cyber Risk taxonomy for maritime IS users? 
RQ5a: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber SA based on their age, gender, nationality, 
department, years at performing job, education level, or psychological state 
of mind? 
RQ5b: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to maritime IS 
users' aggregated level of Cyber Curiosity based on their age, gender, 
nationality, department, years performing job, education level, or 
psychological state of mind? 
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RQ5c: Are there any statistically significant mean differences to an IS user’s 
Cyber Risk score based on their age, gender, nationality, department, years 
performing job, education level, or psychological state of mind? 
This research study made several contributions to the Information Security body 
of knowledge. The first was by designing, developing, and empirically validating an IS 
Cyber SA, in the context of Cyber Curiosity, Cyber Risk taxonomy that measures the 
susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering techniques on IS users 
in the maritime industry. The second is that this study helped advance current research in 
cybersecurity and contribute to the body of knowledge regarding IS users as it relates to 
their awareness of social engineering cyber-attacks. Another significance of this study is 
the unusual context of the research setting. The maritime industry, specifically passenger 
vessels, presented a unique research study environment where crew spend a significant 
amount of time in constant interaction with passengers and are also away from family for 
extended periods of time. This interaction and enclosed environment provided an 
interesting dynamic to cyber situational awareness and Cyber Curiosity research further 
contributing to the IS body of knowledge. 
In conclusion, maritime organizations can use the developed cyber risk taxonomy 
and the research results to help reduce social engineering cyber risks and improve cyber 
situational awareness. Other researchers can use the developed cyber risk taxonomy to 
assess cyber situational awareness and cyber curiosity in other environments. Lastly, 
security and awareness programs can use the validated Cyber Curiosity components to 
better assess an IS users type of curiosity to better entice use to raise cyber situational 
awareness.   
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Appendix C 
 
Expert Panel Recruitment Email 
 
 
Dear Cybersecurity Experts, 
 
I need your assistance in providing expert feedback on set of measures for my upcoming 
doctoral research study. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Assurance and 
Cybersecurity at the College of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern 
University (NSU), working under the supervision of Professor Dr. Yair Levy. My 
research is seeking to develop a Cyber Risk taxonomy to classify maritime IS users by 
their level of cyber situational awareness (SA) and Cyber Curiosity of Information 
Systems (IS) users. 
 
In this part of the research, I need your assistance in validating the proposed components 
for the measures and scores of cyber situational awareness (CSA) and Cyber Curiosity 
levels to help develop and empirically validate an IS cyber situational awareness (SA) 
taxonomy in the context of Cyber Curiosity that can be used as a benchmark to measure 
the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social engineering techniques among 
IS users. 
 
Below are definitions used in the research study: 
 
• Cybersecurity – The protection of cyberspace, the electronic information, the 
infrastructure that supports cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their 
personal, societal, and national capacity including any of their interests that are 
vulnerable to attacks originating in cyberspace (Solms & Niekerk, 2013).  
 
• Cyber Situational Awareness - The perception of cyber risk elements with respect 
to time and space, the understanding of their meaning, and anticipation of their 
status in the near future (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
 
• Cyber Curiosity - Cyber Curiosity is the desire for information and knowledge 
about information systems (IS) and the Internet. 
 
• Social engineering - A technique used by hackers, leveraging human interactions 
or social skills, to obtain or compromise IS information to infiltrate an 
organizations network (US-CERT, 2016). 
 
The information provided with your assistance will be used for this research study in 
aggregated form. No personally identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a 
participate, you agree to keep all the information regarding this research confidential and 
refrain from disclosing any details related to this survey or the material contained within 
it.  
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Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution for this research study.  
 
Regards, 
Guillermo Perez, Ph.D. Candidate 
E-mail:gp90@mynsu.nova.edu 
Information Assurance and Cybersecurity 
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Appendix D 
 
Expert Panel Questionnaire: Instrument for Subject Matter Expert (SME) 
validation of components for the measures of Cyber Situational Awareness 
(CSA) and Cyber Curiosity Levels 
 
 
  
122 
 
 
 
Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
 
 
  
  
126 
Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire - Components & Measures (Cont.) 
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Appendix E 
 
Expert Panel Recruitment Email 
 
 
Dear Cybersecurity Experts, 
 
I need your assistance in providing expert feedback on set of measures for my upcoming 
doctoral research study. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Assurance and 
Cybersecurity at the College of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern 
University (NSU), working under the supervision of Professor Dr. Yair Levy. My 
research is seeking to develop a Cyber Risk taxonomy to classify maritime IS users by 
their level of cyber situational awareness (SA) and Cyber Curiosity of Information 
Systems (IS) users. 
 
In this part of the research, I need your assistance in validating the proposed Cyber Risk 
Taxonomy components to help develop and empirically validate an IS cyber situational 
awareness (SA) taxonomy in the context of Cyber Curiosity that can be used as a 
benchmark to measure the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using social 
engineering techniques among IS users. 
 
Below are definitions used in the research study: 
 
• Cybersecurity – The protection of cyberspace, the electronic information, the 
infrastructure that supports cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their 
personal, societal, and national capacity including any of their interests that are 
vulnerable to attacks originating in cyberspace (Solms & Niekerk, 2013).  
 
• Cyber Curiosity - Cyber Curiosity is the desire for information and knowledge 
about information systems (IS) and the Internet. 
 
• Cyber Situational Awareness - The perception of cyber risk elements with respect 
to time and space, the understanding of their meaning, and anticipation of their 
status in the near future (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
 
• Social engineering - A technique used by hackers, leveraging human interactions 
or social skills, to obtain or compromise IS information to infiltrate an 
organization's network (US-CERT, 2016). 
 
• Subject Matter Expert (SME) – A highly knowledgeable individual who performs 
specialized functions in given organizational processes (Encyclopedia, n.d.). 
 
The information provided with your assistance will be used for this research study in 
aggregated form. No personally identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a 
participate, you agree to keep all the information regarding this research confidential and 
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refrain from disclosing any details related to this survey or the material contained within 
it.  
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution for this research study.  
 
Regards, 
Guillermo Perez, Ph.D. Candidate 
E-mail:gp90@mynsu.nova.edu 
Information Assurance and Cybersecurity 
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Appendix F 
 
Expert Panel Questionnaire: Instrument for Subject Matter Expert (SME) 
Validation of Proposed Cyber Risk Taxonomy 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire – Risk Taxonomy (Cont.) 
 
 
  
137 
Expert Panel Questionnaire – Risk Taxonomy (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire – Risk Taxonomy (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire – Risk Taxonomy (Cont.) 
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Expert Panel Questionnaire – Risk Taxonomy (Cont.) 
 
 
  
  
141 
 
Appendix G 
 
Pilot Research Study Recruitment Email 
 
 
Dear Cybersecurity Experts, 
 
I need your assistance in a pilot research study in fulfillment of my doctoral research 
study. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Assurance and Cybersecurity at the College 
of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern University (NSU), working under the 
supervision of Professor Dr. Yair Levy. My research is seeking to develop a Cyber Risk 
taxonomy to classify maritime IS users by their level of cyber situational awareness (SA) 
and Cyber Curiosity of Information Systems (IS) users. 
 
In this part of the research, I need your assistance to ensure the interactive Web-based 
experiment is working accurately. The experiment will measure cyber situational 
awareness (CSA) and Cyber Curiosity levels to help develop and empirically validate an 
IS cyber situational awareness (SA) taxonomy in the context of Cyber Curiosity that can 
be used as a benchmark to measure the susceptibility of mitigating a cyber-attack using 
social engineering techniques among IS users. 
 
Below are definitions used in the research study: 
 
• Cybersecurity – The protection of cyberspace, the electronic information, the 
infrastructure that supports cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their 
personal, societal, and national capacity including any of their interests that are 
vulnerable to attacks originating in cyberspace (Solms & Niekerk, 2013).  
 
• Cyber Situational Awareness - The perception of cyber risk elements with respect 
to time and space, the understanding of their meaning, and anticipation of their 
status in the near future (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
 
• Cyber Curiosity - Cyber Curiosity is the desire for information and knowledge 
about information systems (IS) and the Internet. 
 
• Social engineering - A technique used by hackers, leveraging human interactions 
or social skills, to obtain or compromise IS information to infiltrate an 
organizations network (US-CERT, 2016). 
 
The information provided with your assistance will be used for this research study in 
aggregated form. No personally identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a 
participate, you agree to keep all the information regarding this research confidential and 
refrain from disclosing any details related to this survey or the material contained within 
it.  
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Pilot Research Study Recruitment Email (Cont.) 
 
 
If you are willing to participate, please reply to this email and we will schedule an 
appointment. 
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution for this research study.  
 
Should you wish to receive the findings of the study, please send me an email and I will 
gladly provide you with the information about the academic research publication(s) 
resulting from this study. 
 
Regards, 
Guillermo Perez, Ph.D. Candidate 
E-mail:gp90@mynsu.nova.edu 
Information Assurance and Cybersecurity 
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Appendix H 
 
Pilot Study Informed Consent Form 
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 Pilot Study Informed Consent Form (Cont.) 
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Pilot Study Informed Consent Form (Cont.) 
 
 
  
  
146 
Pilot Study Informed Consent Form (Cont.) 
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Appendix I 
 
Research Study Recruitment Email 
 
 
Dear Potential Research Participants, 
 
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Assurance and Cybersecurity at the College of 
Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern University (NSU), working under the 
supervision of Professor Dr. Yair Levy. I am reaching out to you to voluntarily take part 
in my research that is seeking to develop a Cyber Risk taxonomy to classify maritime 
Information Systems (IS) users by their level of cyber situational awareness (SA) and 
Cyber Curiosity. 
 
Your participation will include filling out a pre-experiment survey and then interacting 
with a Web-based application. The information provided with your assistance will be 
used for this research study in aggregated form. No personally identifiable information 
(PII) will be collected. As a participate, you agree to keep all the information regarding 
this research confidential and refrain from disclosing any details related to this survey or 
the material contained within it.  
 
If you are willing to participate, please reply to this email and we will schedule an 
appointment. 
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution for this research study.  
 
Should you wish to receive the findings of the study, please send me an email and I will 
gladly provide you with the information about the academic research publication(s) 
resulting from this study. 
 
Regards, 
Guillermo Perez, Ph.D. Candidate 
E-mail:gp90@mynsu.nova.edu 
Information Assurance and Cybersecurity 
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Appendix J 
 
Research Study Informed Consent Form 
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Research Study Informed Consent Form (Cont.) 
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Research Study Informed Consent Form (Cont.) 
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Appendix K 
 
Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Shipboard) 
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Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
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Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
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Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
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Appendix L 
 
Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Shoreside) 
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Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
 
 
  
  
157 
Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
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Pre-Experiment Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
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Appendix M 
 
Blueprint of the Proposed Initial Measures 
 
 The blueprint for the proposed initial measures for this research study consists of 
a series of experiment scenarios that presents the participant with links and choices to 
measures their level of Cyber Curiosity and Cyber SA. Table 9 and Table 10 show the 
proposed measures for the user action selection for Cyber SA and Cyber Curiosity.  
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Blueprint of the proposed initial measures (Cont.) 
 
Table 9 
Cyber SA Time Measurement Points (CSA-tm) 
Level Experiment User Action Timing Categories Points 
A
dv
an
ce
d 
Advanced social engineering attack identified under 20 seconds 4 
Advanced social engineering attack identified between 20 
seconds and 30 seconds 
2 
Advanced social engineering attack identified longer than 30 
seconds 
0 
Si
m
pl
e 
Simple social engineering attack identified under 30 seconds 2 
Simple social engineering attack identified between 20 seconds 
and 30 seconds 
1 
Simple social engineering attack identified longer than 30 
seconds 
0 
 
 
Table 10 
Cyber Curiosity Measurement Points 
 
 Curiosity Type  
Experiment User Action Selection I-Type D-Type Points  
Simple explanation (User will be presented with link 
to expand on explaining the section of the experiment 
such as “Learn more about Phishing Email 
Situational Awareness”  
 x -1 
In-depth explanation (User will be presented with a 
link in the simple explanation section to seek further 
information such as “To learn further information 
about Phishing Email Situational Awareness” 
 x -2 
Enticing Web link (User will be presented with a link 
to a non-SA awareness page with an entertaining 
story or topic.) 
x  1 
Enticing Pop-up Web link (User will be presented 
with a pop-up to a non-SA awareness page with an 
entertaining story or topic.) 
x  2 
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